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WORKSHOP SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
On 29 October 2015 an event was hosted by the Army’s 
Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research 
(CHACR) in which approximately 50 high-level delegates 
drawn from the Army, the private sector, the civil service 
and academia came together in a closed forum to challenge 
established British Army thinking. The forum was held 
in the spirit of  an objective and critical evaluation of  the 
assumptions the Army makes about the delivery of  the Whole 
Force Approach (WFA). What follows is a synthesis of  the 
participants’ discussions in break-out and plenary groups, all 
held under the Chatham House Rule1.
Establishing the scope of  the WFA
It was agreed by all participants that the question of  working 
alongside others is not a new challenge for the Army and that 
many of  the issues have been examined in other fora and 
continue to be so in several extant working groups. However, 
it was widely recognised that the situation has changed and 
that the Army is now seen as being in a ‘different place’. 
The WFA, with the implication of  manpower substitution, 
has been transformed from 
perceived threat to a necessary 
and vital concept for the Army 
now and in the future. On 
the rhetorical level, it was felt 
that more could be done to 
communicate to the wider Army 
and society at large that the 
language should now change 
from one of  risk to one of  
opportunity.
It was suggested that there are 
even signs that the WFA could 
actually come to be viewed as 
a desirable course of  action in 
that it would free the Army to 
place greater emphasis on the 
tasks that only it can deliver and to allow soldiers to focus ‘on 
sharpening the bayonet’. Military participants were, however, 
reminded that even the delivery of  lethal force often involves 
industry and civil servants and a senior military attendee 
reminded the group that contemporary warfare often sees 
industry involved in kill chain activities, albeit always ‘with 
soldiers’ fingers on the trigger’. Industry representatives 
reminded their Army brethren that it was their job to ‘make 
the bayonet stronger and lighter’ and therefore that the Army 
should include industry in practically all aspects of  military 
activity.  It was emphasised that this was not a call to privatise 
the Army but instead to recognise the industrial contribution 
that is sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in Army 
activity, but almost always present in some form or other.  
The day’s discussions were dominated by the industrial 
element of  the WFA, largely 
due to the very small number 
of  civil servants who accepted 
the invitation to attend the 
workshop. Several military 
participants suggested that the 
Army-industry relationship 
was the hardest element of  the 
WFA approach to implement. 
However, syndicate discussion 
revealed that the civil service 
believes that the cultural divide 
between civilian government 
employees and the Army is 
potentially even greater. This 
came as a surprise to many Army 
attendees, who had assumed 
that the on-the-ground approach 
of  cross-departmental working developed in Afghanistan was 
replicated and embedded in Whitehall. While it was recognised 
that the Stabilisation Unit is bravely trying to keep this flame 
alive, participants were sceptical that the ‘integrated approach’ 
is as eagerly embraced in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and Department for International Development 
(DfID) as it is in the Army and MoD. It was observed that the 
civil service does ‘not do contingency’ and that its manpower 
practices mean that it does not have sufficient capacity to 
attend all the different preparatory events that the Army would 
like it to, such as collective training exercises or command post 
exercises. Instead, the civil service manages crisis response by 
reassigning staff from core line functions, essentially ‘robbing 
Peter to pay Paul’. Of  particular relevance to the Army-
industry relationship was the observation that the civil service 
has a standing approach to ‘surging capacity’ centred on the 
creation of  small, bespoke teams of  civil servants who are 
then rapidly augmented through recourse to one of  a small 
number of  trusted contracting organisations. Many senior 
Army participants agreed that this was a model which required 
greater scrutiny on behalf  of  the Army and that all possible 
lessons should be learned from the civil service’s experience.
Several participants lamented that the Army Reserve was 
not adequately represented at the workshop. Industry 
representatives also cautioned that the Sponsored Reserves 
concept should not be seen as a panacea and was unlikely to 
feature prominently in the achievement of  the WFA. It was 
furthermore observed that the Regular Army has still not 
grasped that the Reserve could potentially be a huge force 
multiplier in the delivery of  the WFA, not least because the 
civilian jobs of  Army Reservists were very often those required 
by the Regular Army to fulfil skills shortages. A comprehensive 
data collection effort to identify the civilian employment 
categories and employers of  the Army Reserve was 
recommended. It was furthermore noted by one participant 
that the Army Reserve includes a significant number of  civil 
servants and that this group represents a ready-made group of  
Army-friendly individuals who could assist the Army in better 
understanding the civil service culture and act as ambassadors, 
educators and communicators in the delivery of  the Army-
civil service element of  the WFA.
There are signs that 
the Whole Force 
Approach could 
actually come to be 
viewed as a desirable 
course of  action in 
that it would free 
the Army to place 
greater emphasis on 
the tasks that only 
it can deliver
“”
1The Chatham House Rule asserts that: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under 
the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither 
the identity nor the affiliation of  the speaker(s), nor that of  any other participant, may be 
revealed.”
Joint effort: Industry delegates stressed 
it was their job to ‘make the bayonet 
stronger and lighter’ and that the Army 
should include the private sector in all 
aspects of  military activity.
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Testing the limits
The overall question of  whether any areas of  Army capability 
should remain off limits to contractors was raised, phrased as 
‘is defence a jealously guarded function of  defence?’. It was 
agreed that such a fundamental question was one that could 
only be answered by lawyers and politicians, but that this was 
not an excuse for the Army to avoid answering difficult and 
far-reaching questions regarding the scope of  the WFA. The 
point was emphasised that it is incumbent on the Army to 
ensure that these difficult questions are proactively asked of  
the right people at the highest levels.  
It was observed that the single greatest barrier towards 
delivering the WFA was the Army’s unfamiliarity with industry. 
Private sector participants observed that military people on 
the whole do not understand industry and commerce and 
their needs well enough. This creates an environment of  at 
best reservation, more commonly defensiveness and at worst 
hostility as the starting point for Army-industry conversations.  
It was strongly emphasised by several participants that the 
need for industrial familiarity and a change in Army mindset 
does not just apply to senior level Army leadership. It was 
agreed that Army practitioners at the tactical level who are 
the end users of  WFA relationships need to be made more 
familiar with industry and contractors too. It was suggested 
that industry should make better use of  retired Army officers, 
many of  whom have high-end and unique skill sets. Several 
delegates reinforced this point with the observation that all too 
often retired officers who undertake second careers in industry 
are to be found languishing in business development roles for 
which they are actually not particularly well suited, lacking 
the relevant commercial experience. It was agreed that the era 
of  the old boy network was seen as outdated if  not irrelevant, 
and that retired officers should be used more effectively than 
as door-openers to their former colleagues still serving in the 
Army. It was felt that this would help to reinforce linkages, 
develop familiarity and understanding. Participants agreed that 
on a corporate level the Army needs to be more aware of  what 
industry can offer and be more willing to embrace it. This 
could potentially enable it to avoid having to create required 
skills from scratch, which is expensive in both time and money. 
Off-the-shelf  and adaptable pre-existing skill sets were felt to 
be available in industry but are under-recognised by the Army 
and poorly communicated by the private sector.
Linked to this point, there was debate amongst participants 
over how quickly the WFA might be implemented, given 
that evidence of  its effects were not well understood. The 
need to push candidate approaches and to develop pilot and 
pathfinder schemes for testing the WFA and monitoring 
results was highlighted by several Army representatives. It was 
suggested that the support solutions space was a good example 
that can yield both past experience and significant evidence.  
In particular, the Army representatives suggested picking a 
couple of  capabilities closer to the operational deployment 
end of  the spectrum to test. On the other hand, industry 
representatives cautioned that pilot schemes may actually 
further delay progress in delivering the WFA as ‘nothing will 
be done until results are in’. These same participants also 
observed that pathfinder projects may provide targets for 
people not so keen on the idea of  the WFA to shoot down.
This potential problem was conceded, but it was maintained 
that exemplars were still needed to prove WFA can work in 
different ways and areas. One suggestion was to use people 
with experience of  the WFA in practice to form a red team 
to stress-test potential pathfinders and pilot studies before 
they are funded and implemented. Industry representatives 
suggested that there was already a lot of  evidence sufficient 
for this and that lessons could be learned from other nations. 
The prime example suggested for study was the US but other 
models of  the WFA both past and present were suggested in 
countries including Israel, Turkey and South Africa. Whilst 
it was observed that from a UK perspective, some of  these 
nations had taken things too far in terms of  how much of  
society had been wrapped into the military, it was suggested 
that this was a useful lesson in itself. Many participants agreed 
that individual case study countries’ experience could certainly 
be sufficiently disaggregated into their constituent parts so 
as to provide useful lessons. Surrounding this discussion was 
the notion that MoD and the Army must force themselves 
to be more open minded about the potential shape of  the 
WFA and to embrace greater risk-taking when examining and 
considering potential delivery mechanisms.
Time and again discussion turned to the point that the 
Army’s cultural practices represent the greatest impediment to 
implementing a more innovative and effective WFA. Several 
industry participants commented on the fact that even in 
those branches of  the Army where it is already agreed that 
the WFA is a good thing, that officers do not think to get 
industry involved until the point where they are ready to issue 
a contract or to spend money. Particular criticism was directed 
at those elements of  the Army and the MoD which deal with 
conceptual development and doctrine, with industry rarely, 
if  ever, invited to contribute on those subjects, even when 
they pertain directly to Army-industry relationships. Private 
sector attendees urged the Army officers present to inculcate 
and encourage a culture of  ‘think of  us as part of  you’ and 
to get industry directly involved in developing doctrine and 
in training scenarios. On this latter point, it was emphasised 
that industry must not just be seen as the people delivering the 
training but that the presence of  industry and the implications 
of  that presence must be developed as a distinct subject within 
the training environment. Moreover, the Army was exhorted 
to stop waiting for the WFA revolution to happen and instead 
to forge ahead with small steps that cumulatively represent an 
evolutionary approach.
Pushing the boundaries
It was posited that industry could replace, duplicate or 
The Army was exhorted to stop waiting for the 
Whole Force Approach revolution to happen 
and instead to forge ahead with small steps that 
cumulatively represent an evolutionary approach
“”
The era of  the old boy network was seen as 
outdated if  not irrelevant, and that retired 
officers should be used more effectively than as 
door-openers to their former colleagues
“”
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supplement almost any capability that the Army currently 
fields but it was noted that this would not necessarily always 
be a cheaper way of  producing it. Industry also faces similar 
problems to the Army in developing and maintaining 
capabilities, as development takes time and maintaining 
capabilities at readiness necessarily incurs costs. However, 
it was emphasised that industry is able to respond to skills 
shortages by being able to offer more attractive rates of  
compensation and thus attract the requisite individuals more 
easily than the Army. Only by fully embracing the WFA 
can the Army then gain access to these scarce personnel 
resources.
Discussion revealed a broad consensus on the notion that the 
WFA represents a ‘continuum of  opportunity’ for industry, as 
discussions now cover a much broader range of  capabilities 
than in the past. For industry, there are opportunities for 
business development away from some narrowly-defined 
areas and for the Army the opportunity to embrace new 
ways of  doing business that could allow military resources 
to be employed differently. The personal involvement of  
the Chief  of  the General Staff in championing and driving 
forward the WFA was recognised and praised by industry 
attendees and taken as a sign that the Army leadership’s 
mindset has shifted to a point where the WFA is seen as an 
opportunity to respond innovatively to the challenges of  the 
changing character of  conflict.  
Attendees also observed that the Army will face particular 
challenges that relate to the presence in the battlespace of  
multiple agencies alongside MoD, such as DfID, FCO and 
Non-Governmental Organisations as well as agencies and 
departments of  both the host nation and other nations 
involved in the operation. It was felt by both Army and 
industry attendees that this certainly further complicates the 
environment in which contractors are likely to be utilised. 
However, it was agreed that the appropriate response to this 
complication was greater innovation in the size and shape 
of  the WFA. Both parties were seized of  the need to identify 
and implement solutions that go far beyond the scope and 
level of  ambition associated with the more traditional 
procurement relationships of  the sort employed in the 
Army’s home base.
Industry representatives acknowledged that their side needs to 
challenge themselves to offer more than just equipment and 
Sponsored Reserves, including new skill sets hitherto not seen 
as a priority. A suggestion was made to harness more civilian 
management skills from business and consultancies to help 
manage the plethora of  different agencies likely to be present 
in the deployed space.
Linked to this latter point, several attendees emphasised that 
thinking on implementation needed to be broadened to a 
‘whole of  government’ approach, rather than a military ‘whole 
force’ approach. It was however acknowledged that rolling 
this out in the deployed space, in particular for non-traditional 
operations where hard power military effect is not the central 
objective, is difficult. Soft power, stabilisation, reconstruction 
and capacity-building approaches were acknowledged to 
be trickier than the more straightforward current practice 
of  procuring equipment or deploying Reserves. However, it 
was suggested that the latter point basically just needs more 
discussion on what can be contracted out and where the 
legal red lines lie, so that everyone understands the limits of  
such potential arrangements. The trick, it was suggested, lies 
in learning how to develop contracting models to include 
capacity-building components for contracting ahead of  actual 
deployment.
Build trust to go forward
In working towards the delivery of  the WFA, participants 
concurred that increased levels of  trust between current and 
future Army and industrial partners would need to be the 
bedrock of  the relationship. It was emphasised that to gain 
the best possible outputs for both parties, military-contractor 
relationships need to be about ‘more than just the contract’. 
This argument was underpinned by the idea that improving 
familiarity with one another is perhaps the single greatest 
element necessary to deliver that trust. Several participants 
suggested that longevity of  contracts can help to foster this 
trust, and that establishing and maintaining preferred suppliers 
(including looking after the current crop) was especially 
important in more sensitive areas. Practical examples that 
were suggested included the potential to form joint enterprises 
that operate outside a simple transactional contracting 
arrangement but which would revert to a traditional customer-
contractor approach once the capability is deployed. One 
participant also suggested revisiting the notion of  lateral entry 
to the Army for mid-career professionals from industry, as 
there are many military roles that do not appear to require 
accumulated military experience. However, it was recognised 
and conceded that due regard must be paid to the effect 
this would have on career structures and opportunities for 
advancement of  career Army personnel.
It was agreed that the Army is doing well at developing 
close relationships with some of  the major service providers.  
However, it was widely agreed that there is a need to make 
progress in building relationships with small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are often able to demonstrate 
greater innovation in developing more flexible and agile 
business models that could fill or contribute to many Army 
roles, although the benefits of  the economies of  scale and 
financial resilience of  larger organisations were also reiterated. 
The point was made that the Army must broaden its horizons 
in order to properly understand the full range of  industry 
organisations of  all shapes and sizes that could potentially 
contribute towards the effective delivery of  the WFA.
‘Think of  us as part of  you’: Representatives from companies such as NSC – which recently 
supported 2 YORKS’ conversion to Foxhound – should not just be seen as people delivering 
training but the presence of  industry and the implications of  that presence must be developed 
within the training environment, according to private sector attendees. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
We have been talking about a Whole Force Concept, now 
Whole Force Approach (WFA), for a long time and some 
notable progress has been made. For instance, in the training 
domain with Holdfast Training Services supporting training at 
the Royal School of  Military Engineering and in equipment 
support with Babcock’s appointment to the Defence Support 
Group contract.
However, we now need to take this to a new level. Lord 
Levene’s review and the implementation of  his delegated 
model are not a choice. We have to live within our means, 
forcing us to seek imaginative and agile ways of  doing 
business. So, from my perspective, the drivers to exploit a WFA 
are profound, not least the following: we want to maximise 
our front-end capability at a time when the cost of  full-time 
military manpower is ever growing. We want to have niche 
and cutting-edge talent and skills, but the cost and effectiveness 
of  growing such capability within the institution means we 
must draw these from the widest possible market. To thrive we 
need to seek investment, ingenuity and best practice, because 
these will be force multipliers to the effectiveness of  our 
organisation, and we need to contribute to national prosperity.
There is clearly a place for WFA to satisfy many of  these 
drivers; but what is our appetite? Whilst there may be merit 
in focusing on the non-deployable, ‘firm base’ first, I am not 
entirely convinced that this is the best way to look at it. I have 
spoken often about the nature of  the strategic context, drawing 
attention to this era of  constant competition in which we now 
live, and to the fact that the distinction between home and 
away is blurred. The nature of  the battlefield is also changing; 
is ‘rear area’ an appropriate term any more?
So instead I think we should adopt a functional approach.  
WFA should probably be exploited in most areas of  our 
endeavour – less combat perhaps, although I acknowledge that 
during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan commercial 
expertise played a role in the ‘kill chain’, for instance through 
the provision of  base ISTAR. And we must also be conscious 
of  the nuance of  some ‘backroom’ functions; for example 
we have had to restore some of  the military staff in the RPP 
contract so that we have role models for our recruits. We 
should, therefore, roll out WFA incrementally, building on 
success and testing our doctrine as we go. Early on though, we 
must form a clear view of  what must be delivered by military, 
versus what can be a WFA task. This should be informed by 
the function and by considering, amongst other factors, the 
liability and commitment; the notion of  service. We will never 
expect unlimited liability to fall anywhere other than our 
Armed Forces and so we must look carefully at the risks; the 
nature of  the task; and the readiness requirement.  
We should start with the more straightforward areas and 
reinforce success. For example, building on the models proved 
at RAF Odiham, in the DSG, in the training function with 
ARTD and CTG, and with continuity posts in places like DLW. 
We need to take a truly holistic view and ensure our progress 
is the product of  a clear strategy. Tribalism or a reluctance to 
fully embrace the concept will only let the opportunity of  WFA 
slip by. WFA is not just about manpower substitution, nor is it 
a CDP/D Pers lead. We need to understand the dependencies 
within our business, which remains complex, and it requires 
top-down direction. Above all it needs leadership and 
imagination; business change should be a pan-Defence Lines 
of  Development undertaking led by capability.
We must recognise that this is cultural shift; the goal is for the 
Army and industry to act as trusted allies. We will need to 
be clear about areas of  addressable spend to drive the right 
incentivised behaviours. Longevity will be important because 
it is far more likely to encourage investment. Short-term 
contracts and ‘competition’ won’t work in this regard, after 
all, you can’t surge trust. Instead we must foster and rely on 
integrated relationships.
My own HQ is embracing all of  these principles in seeking 
a ‘Capability Injection’ from the commercial sector. We are 
currently in the selection process for a strategic partner to help 
us identify and then implement opportunities for efficiencies 
and to reduce our strategic cost base.
We must, however, rigorously test our approach and be clear-
eyed as we proceed. We must ensure we understand first and 
second order consequences in order to avoid the inadvertent 
creation of  perverse outcomes, some of  which I witnessed 
firsthand as a Divisional Commander in Afghanistan. And we 
must make sensible assumptions on scale; we do not wish to be 
over-faced come the day and we cannot afford surprises.
Notwithstanding these reservations, I regard the WFA as a 
panacea for greater productivity and efficiency. We have work 
to do to change the Army’s culture to make it more accepting 
of  the idea; that WFA is not an unfortunate necessity, but an 
indispensable requirement of  our future operational capability. 
As a first step we should ensure that we have an agreed, 
shared lexicon, doctrine and understanding with our potential 
commercial partners. We look forward to working together to 
achieve this.
Words: Gen Sir Nick Carter, Chief  of  the General Staff
We have work to do to change the Army’s 
culture to make it more accepting of  the 
idea; that Whole Force Approach is not an 
unfortunate necessity, but an indispensable 
requirement of  our future operational capability 
“”
To thrive we need to seek investment, 
ingenuity and best practice, because these 
will be force multipliers to the effectiveness 
of  our organisation, and we need to 
contribute to national prosperity
“”
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WHOLE FORCE APPROACH THINK PIECE 
– BASED ON LOGISTIC EXPERIENCE
The story so far
l Whole Force Approach (WFA) only new in name,   
logistic and engineering support requirements have been 
met by a mixed force for generations.
l Personnel from industry deployed on Op Granby to 
support key equipment and a number of  logistic and 
infrastructure services were contracted out.  
 
l Both Op Telic and Op Herrick saw significant 
deployments of  Volunteer Reserves2 (VR) and a third of  
our HETs [heavy equipment transporters] were operated 
by Sponsored Reserves (SR). At its height, our Op Herrick 
contingent included more than 5,000 contractors.
l A2020/ARO designs-in a significant non-Regular   
element3 to the logistic contribution to ops starting   
in ‘roulement 1’, increasing in subsequent roulements.
 
l Current WFA projects with industry partners  
include: HET operators, Sea Mounting Centre and port  
operators, Joint Operational Fuel System petroleum 
operators, Hestia chefs, British Diving Safety Group power 
pack repairers.  
What works
l Non-Regular solutions offer a range of  benefits, such 
as access to a wider pool of  personnel with specialist skills 
and whether manpower substitution or not, this can help 
drive down Regular liability.
l Commercial/contracted solutions offer a viable method 
of  acquiring specialists or surge capacity that we do not 
wish to maintain continuously, we just need to understand 
what can be achieved at readiness and get better at 
contract management. 
l SR have proved to be a reliable way of  delivering 
capability in areas where the personnel perform the same 
role for the military at home out of  uniform.
l Experience would suggest WFA is better as a headroom 
lever than purely a cost reduction lever for anything at 
meaningful readiness and risk. 
l VR have provided useful trusted back-fill for Regular 
capability, albeit quite expensively in terms of  both cost 
and effort4.
Thoughts for the way ahead
l A defence-wide strategic/enterprise approach with a 
consistent cost model would allow proper judgement of  
cost, benefit and balance of  investment. 
l Force mix decisions must be capability-led and we must 
go back to first principles; asking what level of  readiness 
and flexibility is required, in what threat environments and 
to what level of  assurance?  
 
l We must avoid morally bereft practice of  contracts that 
result in indirectly recruited third-world personnel being 
put in harm’s way as a means of  reducing UK boots on 
the ground and ultimately casualties.
l Having applied the WFA almost exclusively to the 
support areas, we need to explore wider technical areas 
such as aviation support, ISTAR, communication 
information systems and cyber.
 
l Need to understand industry’s appetite and capacity 
before taking decisions. Benefits should not be taken until 
IOC otherwise it can produce capability gaps. 
What doesn’t work
l There remains a tendency for WFA to equal manpower 
substitution.
l Messaging about the WFA has been inconsistent and 
confusing.
l Industry doesn’t maintain ‘spare’ capacity that can be 
thrown at either SR or VR tasks so we need to understand 
exactly where the appetite is.
l The current reliance on VR in roulement 1 is unrealistic 
and represents a significant risk. 
l Ring-fenced WF solutions and fixed contracts reduce 
our options when faced with savings targets. They also 
result in a requirement for even greater flexibility and 
resilience from reduced numbers of  Regular personnel.
l Despite the hype, non-Regular solutions seldom 
represent better value for money.
2Limited by policy to circa 10 per cent of  any unit strength.
3RLC element of  best effort Div comprises circa 289 SR and 1,700 VR including formed 
squadrons.
4The often cited examples of  VR utility such as The Londons, 4 Para and 21 SAS are 
exceptional due to the nature of  who they attract and we must be realistic about deployability 
ratios. The true position has been mis-represented by some over-optimistic senior VR officers.
CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA – TIME 
FOR MORE CONTRACTED SERVICES 
“Meshing with non-governmental organisations and private 
security organisations is also likely to be important if  we 
are going to get the best result...” – Gen Sir Peter Wall 
lecturing on defence engagement at Chatham House5
Strategic landscape
The purpose of  this short article is to set out a case for 
contracted services to Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG’s) 
capacity-building activities in Africa, focusing largely on 
defence-led contributions. It assumes recognition of  the 
strategic significance of  the continent of  Africa to the UK in 
terms of  trade, resources, security and migration. Moreover, 
it assumes the continuing commitment of  a significant 
overseas aid6 and assistance fund, much of  which is consumed 
in Africa7 and is under considerable National Audit Office 
scrutiny to demonstrate better value for money. All this comes 
at a time when direct links to national security are coming 
under increasing threat from ISIS, AQ, AS and Boko Haram 
– to name but a few. Superimpose this, a resurgent Russia and 
recent events in the Ukraine onto a shrinking military and 
financial austerity, and the case for further contracted services 
becomes even more compelling.  
Capacity building
 
Africa is the world’s fastest growing continent, but it is also 
home to some of  the most unstable and poverty-stricken 
countries in the world. So when we speak of  capacity building, 
what do we actually mean? From a Whitehall point of  view, it’s 
all about how to increase security 
and help provide stability as 
a basis for development – be 
that institutional or national 
capacity building – in support 
of  UK security, trade and 
aid objectives. In this regard, 
defence has a major part to 
play working closely with FCO 
[Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office] and DFiD [Department 
for International Development], 
and others such as DBERR8. 
In Africa, the UK contribution 
to training, advice and mentoring is delivered through four 
resident training teams and 11 defence sections. Army 
brigades have recently been aligned to help augment the in-
country teams although it is difficult to envisage what more 
they will be able to deliver aside from the traditional short-
term training teams and a degree of  ‘reach-back’. 
These transient teams reinforce the resident groups to 
deliver specific activities and, as their name suggests, are 
short-term.  Continuity and the all-important relationship-
building are most effectively developed by those resident. Yet 
the appetite for many to be ‘frontier soldiers’ remains low 
through a combination of  factors: family security; education; 
limited or no career opportunities for spouses; and career-
negative implications of  defence 
engagement appointments are 
frequently cited reasons. Whilst 
most activities will be land-
centric in nature, both the Royal 
Navy and, perhaps to a lesser 
degree, the Royal Air Force 
have a part to play. Linking back 
to the strategic landscape, it is 
worth remembering £90 billion 
of  UK trade passes through 
the Gulf  of  Aden and Indian 
Ocean; the maritime security 
element is significant, and air 
travel security has global economic and security implications 
in addition to the protection of  British travellers.
The challenge
The continent is big, the issues are big and the sums involved 
are big. And in some places, colonial legacy remains big too.  
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for defence, and the 
outlook is bleak. Delivery needs to be more efficient, it needs 
more monitoring and evaluation, the scope for irregularities 
needs to be squeezed and, in some places, squeezed hard.  
There needs to be more coherence and co-ordination.
In short, HMG needs to do things better if  the taxpayer 
is to witness real value for money. As General Wall said in 
his lecture in 2014, to get the best result needs a change in 
mindset and a change of  approach which includes greater and 
better use of  the private sector. This is not new.  
Contracted support
A host of  capacity building activities are already undertaken 
by contracted companies, often in a highly-responsive manner. 
Contractors employ seasoned professionals, many of  whom 
are former military and who possess a depth of  knowledge 
not only in their area of  expertise, but also for the geographic 
area in which they willingly work. They do not have the same 
logistic overhead or life support requirements as Service 
personnel who are based in-country with their families.  
Moreover, the precedent for in-country teams to mix civilians 
with military personnel has proved to be highly effective even 
in recent years – for example in the International Security 
Advisory Team Sierra Leone and the British Peace Support 
Team (Eastern Africa) – ISAT SL and BPST(EA). 
In broad terms, a serving resident individual with the same 
skill set can cost as much as twice the amount of  a resident 
contractor. A prime example of  this occurred in BPST(EA) 
5Defence Engagement: The British Army’s Role in Building Stability Overseas; lecture at 
Chatham House, 12 March 2014.
6Overseas Development Aid for this year is some £11.3 billion.
7For example, Ethiopia received £261 million in 2014. 
8Department of  Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.
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with a resident, former military, contractor. He completed 
nearly six years in post and provided continuity, a depth of  
knowledge and a set of  contacts second-to-none. Contractors 
who are not embedded in a team also have unique value, 
especially if  the activity that is being delivered is an enduring 
and recurring requirement. The degree of  support they 
require from the small in-country assets reduces with each 
iteration, leaving the serving military to focus on the higher 
priority and operational business.
Here, HMG might have something to learn from the US 
which has used contractor support wisely for many years. 
In Africa, an example worthy of  mention is the US State 
Department-funded Africa Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance programme – ACOTA9. Country teams from 
contracted companies conduct an array of  training activities. 
The ACOTA teams are virtually all former military and, in 
the past, have included serving US military or others from 
partner nations. It works and with the right people in place, 
it works really well. Importantly, they deliver what is needed 
at a fraction of  the cost and with a much lighter footprint 
than drawing on an already taut military unit. But isn’t this 
what the aligned brigades should be doing? One could argue 
that it is very much their business and it might well become 
core business were it not for all the other commitments. 
Sharing the adventure across a brigade, for example, will 
not engender relationships with the host nation. Nor should 
this be full-time defence attaché work: their focus should be 
on political/military affairs at the strategic level in support 
of  the ambassador/high commissioner, not with low-level 
tactical training.  
Bottom line
Contracted support can fill the gaps and provide real value 
for money. It is an area of  influence activity that HMG must 
undertake by using valuable and limited resources wisely – 
and that should mean using contracted support where defence 
is unable to properly take up the strain.
9ACOTA’s mission statement: to enhance the capacities and capabilities of  its African 
Partner Countries, regional institutions, and the continent’s peacekeeping resources as a whole 
so that they can plan for, train, deploy and sustain sufficient quantities of  professionally-
competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal non-
African assistance.
Her Majesty’s Government might have 
something to learn from the US which has used 
contractor support wisely for many years 
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TAKING AN ENTERPRISE APPROACH TO THE UK 
DEFENCE STRATEGIC WORKFORCE CHALLENGE
Both the MoD and the defence industry recognise that there 
are insufficient suitably-qualified and experienced personnel 
to deliver and sustain current and future defence outputs. 
This problem is a result of  a widespread shortfall in critical 
skills, particularly in engineering and nuclear expertise, 
which is especially acute in the UK. This is becoming the 
most significant risk to defence outputs. The problem is 
compounded by demographic trends and financial pressures, 
as well as a lack of  people entering the workforce with skills in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).
Traditionally, there has been competition between the MoD 
and industry for skilled people, as well as between companies 
within the defence industry. This leads to inefficiencies 
through the defence sector, as well as increased risk in 
delivery and costs in contracts. With the overall skills pool 
continuing to diminish, an adversarial approach is likely to 
be unsustainable and result in a reduction in operational and 
corporate credibility, delays to critical programmes and an 
inability to sustain current or realise future capabilities.
Doing nothing in response is certainly not an option because 
inaction will sustain neither the department’s operational 
commitments nor the defence industry’s ability to meet 
contractual obligations. The department is already doing what 
it can, but current activity has been described as palliatives 
– such as reviewing liabilities, offering financial retention 
initiatives and improving our understanding of  the workforce 
– that, while laudable, are only short-term fixes that are not 
cost-effective. Moreover, their broader, enduring implications 
are not fully tested or understood because they focus on 
symptoms rather than underlying causes. We are already 
trying to do better by attempting to develop the Whole Force 
Approach (WFA) to be more flexible in terms of  people and 
achieve the right mix to support capabilities, but we need to 
expand this to address all the available levers and account for 
the role of  the defence industry 
in our efforts so that we do not 
make things worse through 
competition and incoherence.
Recognising that these options 
fail to address the problem 
holistically and in the longer-
term, a fundamental change 
to the generation, utilisation 
and sustainment of  the wider 
defence skills base is required. 
The Defence Strategic 
Workforce Challenge provides 
an opportunity to advance 
the WFA, leveraging the 
salience and importance of  
this immediate critical skills problem to identify and develop 
the enablers that could facilitate the pan-Defence Lines of  
Development (DLOD) and pan-enterprise management of  
defence capabilities. Adopting such an Enterprise Approach 
(EA) means accepting that we are less concerned with where 
skills are based and much more with how we can access 
them to deliver operational capability. We could take the 
opportunity to redefine the lens through which we view 
defence, focusing on outputs and the capacity and capability 
to deliver them credibly as an overall defence enterprise (DE), 
or by working collaboratively 
across everyone involved in 
developing, generating and 
sustaining military outputs. 
This approach recognises that 
the enterprise is interconnected 
and interdependent, working 
to a shared purpose with a 
shared risk of  failure, and that 
all involved have an interest in 
a healthy overall defence system 
that has sufficient resilience 
to strategic shock. There are 
already success stories where 
collaboration is delivering 
mutual benefits, including 
through the WFA, but we could 
build on these.
To illustrate how an EA might work when applied to critical 
skills, imagine that the overall skills ‘economy’ or enterprise is 
represented by a balloon. Given that we are so short of  critical 
skills, ideally we would like to inflate the size of  this balloon, 
and both the MoD and defence industry have a mutual 
interest in achieving this. However, we also have to bear in 
mind that this is not the only option. We could also increase 
the productivity of  the skills we have, either by getting more 
from our people or by reducing the requirement for critical 
skills, such as through increasing automation. Ideally, we 
need to do all three: optimise our use of  critical skills, exploit 
technology where we can so that we reduce our requirement 
for critical skills, and increase the availability of  critical skills 
where and when needed.  
Once we have our skills enterprise in mind, we need to attract 
people into it. These efforts must begin in schools, in STEM 
initiatives and other efforts, leading to eventually recruiting 
the people we need to meet our requirements. However, an 
EA means that we are less concerned whether people join 
the MoD or industry, so long as we have the critical skills 
we need within the overall DE. If  we collaborate, we can 
align demands and manage them together, reducing our 
transactional costs and encouraging DE values.
To see how this approach might work, consider people we 
have recruited who join the MoD. We will train and develop 
them, particularly by providing them with the command, 
leadership and management training and experience that 
is so valued in industry. Having done so, we would like to 
retain their skills in the overall DE, so we want to minimise 
the ‘leakage’ from the skills balloon. However, if  they wish 
to exit the MoD, we could try to support their transition into 
the defence industry because we thereby keep their skills 
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within the DE and potentially continue to benefit from them 
if, for example, they work on a support contract for one of  
our capabilities. Our investment is not ‘lost’ because we – the 
wider ‘we’ – retain their skills.
If  we now continue the story, there will be some people who 
inevitably exit at this ‘early’ point, perhaps after four or five 
years, because workforce and demographic trends tell us that 
young people today will not seek long careers with a single 
employer and will prefer shorter periods with several. If  
this is the case, we should not fight against it and must help 
people transition, ideally to help support the DE as a whole. 
However, for those we do wish to retain, we can offer further 
development and – as an aspiration for an EA– something 
akin to a ‘guaranteed transition’ into industry at a higher level. 
In short, if  people stay longer, we should align their skills and 
experience with the defence industry (and vice versa) through 
enterprise competence frameworks, supported by ‘skills 
passports’ to enable later transition.
Once people transition into the defence industry, or else if  
they join it at the outset, a similar process could occur: they 
will receive training and develop skills and experience, but 
– like the MoD – the defence industry also wants to retain 
critical skills by minimising leakage. At some stage, people 
may wish to return to work in the MoD, such as through 
Reserve service. Through the development of  enterprise 
competence frameworks, we can make this easier, such as by 
endeavouring to employ people in the same skills fields or by 
maximising the use of  Sponsored Reserves. We could also 
create options for part-time work, without which we currently 
lose people who – for example – wish to leave to have a family 
but would still like to remain within defence, even though they 
might not be able to support a full-time engagement.
Notwithstanding these options, we can do more. An EA is 
likely to mean increasing our use of  contracting for availability 
or developing contracting for capability and including 
requirements for human capability to ensure resilience. For 
example, if  a WFA to a given capability results in a contract 
for capability, we might need to insist that a percentage of  
support personnel are Sponsored Reserves, such that the 
contractor is always able to support emerging tasks if  the 
Whole Force mix is needed on operations. Such requirements 
would then allow us to transition people back into the MoD 
for a defined period.  
Why should we support this movement back and forth within 
a DE? An EA means trying to maintain a healthy balance, 
driven by operational requirements, such that we reduce 
fratricide in our recruiting and our retention initiatives; after 
all, we simply cannot afford to compete for limited critical 
skills. By collaborating, we can increase the efficiency of  the 
DE as a whole, especially if  we can align our incentives and 
our demands for skills while understanding how the movement 
of  skilled people could fit with different stages of  life. 
We could then envisage a new ‘enterprise offer’ of  a career 
spanning the MoD and defence industry, which would 
challenge our existing policy framework but also prompt us to 
potentially share costs and offer career pathways that support 
regular transition between elements of  the overall DE. Ideally 
this enterprise would behave like an ecosystem and become 
self-sustaining, minimising the need for palliative measures 
– largely financial – that we have been relying on to date.  
This strategic perspective means putting into place the legal, 
commercial, policy and other enablers to achieve a DE and 
address critical skills now, but doing so will help facilitate the 
WFA in the longer-term. Therefore, by taking a pan-DLOD, 
pan-enterprise approach to critical skills, we will ultimately 
deliver the Whole Force.
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WHOLE FORCE APPROACH AS 
A NETWORKED APPROACH
In 2011, the Ministry of  Defence set out in a study on the 
future of  the Reserves the challenges faced by incorporating 
a Whole Force Approach (WFA) that extended far beyond 
the role of  the Reserves in a changing British military 
environment. Consistent with a ‘volunteer ethos’ and being 
‘better integrated and understood’ by the public10, UK Armed 
Forces are being pushed towards having to think of  new ways 
to project force and ensure national defence while at the 
same time being pulled and pushed towards security policy 
ranging from cyber to counter-terrorism. These changes are 
characterised by a fundamental change in the resourcing of  
the military but can also be seen as part of  the transformation 
of  European militaries after the end of  the Cold War wherein 
the reliance on large, standing armies has persistently reduced 
even during land warfare operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Perhaps most importantly, a change in the way we might 
think about UK Armed Forces should be thought about in the 
changing relationship between Carl von Clausewitz’s martial 
trinity: the state, military and society.11 The current WFA is 
a way of  networking the ongoing relationship between the 
constituent parts of  this trinity. 
For the great Prussian philosopher of  war, Clausewitz found 
that both war and peace was an iterative relationship between 
the state or government, the military and the larger society. 
Other enlightenment philosophers of  war, such as Antoine-
Henri Jomini, placed the preparation and action of  war firmly 
at the feet of  the military, with both the state and society singly 
behind the war effort. As those trained in strategic philosophy 
will know, these two points of  view are understood as the ‘art’ 
and ‘science’ of  war. If  we look at the 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR), the current role of  the UK’s 
Armed Forces sits in a balance between the political choices of  
state and the wavering support of  public opinion and perhaps 
even strategic culture. Within this context, this short paper 
reflects on historical models of  the WFA and finishes with a 
summation on the lessons learned for 2020 and beyond.
Historical models
The WFA requires collaboration and coordination between: 
a) the Ministry of  Defence (as well as other parts of  
government); 
b) the Armed Forces; 
c) the industrial sector, and; 
d) society through reserves and public support.
In looking at recent history, we can see several models that 
have attempted to approximate the characteristics of  the 
WFA. These are 1) mercantile, 2) expeditionary and 3) 
mobilisation. As we shall see, none of  these postures equate 
to the scope and scale that the WFA seeks to accomplish. We 
can look at each of  these postures in terms of  coordination, 
communication, translation and resources.
1) Mercantilist posture
The early colonial period has characteristics that in many ways 
mirror our own age for two reasons. The first was that the state, 
as it was then, was limited in how much it could control events 
of  world affairs prior to the age of  diplomacy, international 
law and weapons of  mass destruction. Second, innovation, 
and the resources that go with it, was distributed more evenly 
between the public and private sectors. For both these reasons, 
the state relied on its armed forces and commercial sector to 
project power. Coordination relied on a common mercantilist 
prerogative determined by a strong economic interest of  
state equated with maximising power. Communication was a 
function of  a small number of  decision-makers between state 
and commercial interests. Translation was a reduced cost given 
the inherent link then between national and economic power. 
Resources were shared by state and commercial interests as 
were the material risks and profits.12
2) Expeditionary posture
Expeditionary forces were an important part of  the martial 
atmosphere of  the early 20th century. Inherent in the 
definition of  an expeditionary force is the intention to use 
force away from home. In so doing, the mobilisation of  
means to address strategic ends changes from a territorial 
defence posture. Expeditionary forces were used by 
the United Kingdom, United States and Canada prior 
and up to the Second World War. Expeditionary forces 
were then, like they are today, supported by commercial 
firms to supply material goods and logistical knowledge. 
The role of  commercial firms was one of  procurement. 
Society was geographically and popularly disconnected 
from expeditionary forces. In some cases, expeditionary 
operations caused considerable hardship on home industries 
and livelihoods.13 Coordination was top-down during a 
wartime environment and more fluid during times of  
peacetime operations (e.g. United States of  America in The 
Philippines). Cooperation was challenged by the contractual 
obligations of  commercial interests. Further, the public 
10UK Ministry of  Defence, 2011. ‘Commission’s Vision for the Reserve Forces in 2020’ 
London, Ministry of  Defence, p.4.
11Beyerchen, Alan. 1992. ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of  War.’ 
International Security 17(3): 59–90.
12See more recently, Johnston, Christopher Bowen. 2014. ‘China’s Military Mercantilism.’ 
Parameters 44(4): 49.
13Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, 1962, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, 
Ottawa: Minister of  National Defence, pp, 218-9.
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were challenged by both the lack of  communication and the 
strain on local livelihoods. Translation was at a high cost 
as commercial and societal interests were discounted in the 
face of  martial necessities. Resourcing such a posture was 
challenged by the continued need for territorial defence. 
3) Mobilised posture
Finally, a mobilised posture is one we can see in the late Cold 
War era, where a long period of  heightened tensions during 
a ‘Long Peace’14 led government, industry and society to 
work closely together toward a largely understood strategic 
goal. The costs of  communication, coordination and 
translation were at a minimum while resourcing was at its 
highest. The key to this relationship was the directed posture 
and resource available.
Lessons learned
The short historical analysis suggests that there are numerous 
ways to think about the relationship between the state, military 
and society. As we can see, the martial and commercial have 
often been connected in the preparation and operation of  
war. Further, we can see that there is variability in the four 
characteristics listed here. What are the lessons learned for a 
WFA?
l Coordination: The strategic direction of  the WFA must 
be set by the state, fundamental to a democratic government. 
At the same time, strategy should be a result of  a negotiation 
between the government’s ends and the military’s means.15 
l Communication: How the government communicates 
and is able to communicate these objectives will bear on the 
success of  any such networked approach which relies on data 
and information on which to make decisions.
l Translation: In working across so many actors, agencies 
and levels, there is a prospective that a WFA will be challenged 
by poor translation across different government, martial, 
commercial and societal sectors.
l Resourcing: Coordination, communication and 
translation are fundamental to a WFA. They also all 
incur costs. Such an approach requires individual agents 
to understand the overall and intricate nature of  such 
an approach to allow for responsiveness, adaptation and 
innovation as called for by WFA 2020.
Conclusion
The challenges to WFA 2020 and the 2015 SDSR will be 
the balance between seeking to prepare for all threats and 
preparing for the most likely risks. Prior balances between 
militaries, states and societies have either been more directed, 
more cooperative or less complex than the state of  British 
national defence and security today. The UK has the ability 
to be innovative in the way it recruits and retains Reservists, 
how it engages and profits from the industrial sector and how 
it is benefited by a responsive public. This requires observable 
government strategic objectives, as seen in the short discussion 
on postures. At the same time, the WFA needs proper 
resourcing to make it more than a sum of  its constituent parts. 
Being ‘smarter, not poorer’ should produce a networked force 
for 2020 and beyond.16 
14Gaddis, John Lewis. 1987. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of  the Cold War. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
15Strachan, Hew. 2005. “The Lost Meaning of  Strategy.” Survival 47(3): 33–54.
  
16See also, Louth, John, and Pete Quentin. 2014. Making the Whole Force Concept a 
Reality. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.
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The UK has the ability to be innovative in the 
way it recruits and retains Reservists, how it 
engages and profits from the industrial sector 
and how it is benefited by a responsive public
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DELIVERING STABILISATION GOVERNANCE,
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ACTIVITY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE WHOLE FORCE APPROACH – 
VIEWS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Summary
The Whole Force Approach (WFA) offers significant 
opportunities to improve Her Majesty’s Government’s 
(HMG’s) impact in supporting regional strategies 
underpinning security and stability in Fragile and Conflicted 
Affected States (FCAS). Past operational experience offers 
important lessons, however the biggest potential opportunities 
have yet to be fully developed.
Background
The theoretical underpinning of  the Whole Force 
Concept makes sense, but in practice it has proved harder 
to operationalise. Reasons are complex but include 
administrative and operational challenges – budgets and 
funding lines, demarcation of  roles and responsibilities, 
security clearances, duty of  care, reporting lines and 
differences in working culture.
Private development organisations offer niche capabilities 
in areas such as security sector reform, stabilisation and 
governance, social mobilisation and community engagement, 
political influence and strategic communications which are 
an increasingly important component of  HMG’s strategy 
in a variety of  FCAS. In most cases the HMG aspiration is 
to deliver impact through an integrated approach whereby 
UK political engagement enables HMG to achieve specific 
outcomes in governance, security and justice within FCAS 
with a longer-term view to promoting stability and leaving a 
platform for future peaceful politics and development. 
Typical activities are aimed at building institutional capacity 
(for example, police investigation capacity, CT, forensics etc) 
improving accountability (models of  government-citizen 
engagement) and responsiveness (for example, support at 
transition from a police force to a police service that engages 
proactively with the community).
In most cases the private sector has worked in challenging 
security environments and in the absence of  a deployed UK 
military presence. Recent exceptions have been in Iraq (2004 
to 2009), in Afghanistan (2007-date) and in Palestine (2006-
date). Yet there are some interesting trends across government 
that may have potential to support the British Army in 
delivering a full spectrum capability in a timely and cost-
effective manner, which will be discussed on these pages.
A changing environment
The UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy marked 
a step change in aspirations – particularly in the desire 
to intervene upstream to prevent the disintegration of  
potentially fragile states. The current National Security 
Council architecture has now been matched by dedicated 
funding in the form of  the Conflict Stability and Security 
Fund (CSSF), which comes with its own dedicated secretariat 
and programme management capability, with cross-
Whitehall representation. It is understood that the current 
£1 billion CSSF allocation is likely to be substantially 
increased following the current spending review and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Continuing fiscal pressures
The current downward pressure on departmental 
administrative budgets across government means that 
departments are being asked to do more with less. This means 
that delivery and implementation partners such as parts of  the 
military and Reserve and private development companies will 
need to up their game and look at innovative ways of  doing 
business that goes beyond bidding for and delivering discrete 
Productive partnership: Babcock – one of  the three major industry players in the Aircraft 
Carrier Alliance, which will deliver the Royal Navy’s two new Queen Elizabeth Class 
aircraft carriers – is a long-standing technical supplier of  the Ministry of  Defence.
In most cases the private sector has worked in 
challenging security environments and in the 
absence of  a deployed UK military presence
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programmes and responding to call downs from 
framework contracts, but instead assist HMG in 
shaping programmes and establishing enduring 
partnerships with country posts.
One approach that merits further consideration 
is the application of  public-private partnership 
(PPP) models to HMG’s Governance Security 
and Justice portfolio. The MoD appears 
comfortable with its partnerships with major 
technical suppliers such as Babcock; this model 
can equally apply in other areas and it would 
be possible to foresee a civil/military entity 
that provides a deeper level of  expertise and 
capability than is available within the current 
ORBAT, and which would have the agility 
and responsiveness to deliver in a variety of  
different contexts from high-intensity operations 
like Op Herrick through to low-key upstream 
interventions in countries like Pakistan or Egypt 
and institutional reform work with counterpart 
governments.
Complex solutions to complex challenges
Technical work in stabilisation, governance security and 
justice is becoming more complex and challenging, and 
HMG expectations are changing. Recent events in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria and elsewhere have demonstrated clearly 
the limitation of  traditional models of  train and equip and 
top-down capacity development and capacity substitution. 
The response is to look at more politically attuned, problem 
driven adaptive programming – but this implies the ability to 
integrate a wide and changing range of  technical expertise 
to deliver a holistic response that addresses capacity and 
capability whilst working to build demand and political 
ownership to leave behind a locally-owned and sustainable 
solution. This means that it is hard to predict and plan for 
the range of  capability that will be needed in the near and 
medium term. The cost of  generating and maintaining 
in-house capability that is not being exercised is likely to be 
prohibitive in the current fiscal environment – aside from 
being very inefficient.
Practice improves performance
Given the increasing complexity of  this sector, it is apparent 
that the most effective delivery mechanisms will be those 
that are exercised the most frequently. This means that it 
makes sense for the British Army to look to enter partnering 
arrangements with organisations which are constantly 
engaged in stabilisation, governance security and justice work 
in FCAS and to structure partnerships to ensure that serving 
personnel including Regular and Reserves are exposed to the 
cutting edge of  current thinking and experience. Whilst it is 
challenging to achieve this, a modified PPP model could allow 
for secondments, postings and deployments on a continuing 
basis in between operational surges and would be able to offer 
the highest technical expertise.
What capability is needed where?
Broadly speaking, HMG departments look after the policy 
and the strategy. They are not generally well configured to 
deliver implementation. By contrast, the private 
sector has a strong track record for making 
things happen on the ground. The challenge is, 
therefore, how best to combine the talents of  
public and private sectors to deliver full-spectrum 
capability that is able to operate in challenging 
security environments and in places which are 
politically sensitive with the appropriate amount 
of  flexibility and expertise.
Efficiency, economy and effectiveness 
– value for money
The Regular Army is expensive to recruit, 
deploy and maintain. Reserves offer some 
cost savings, but generally with significant 
compromise in terms of  capability and 
flexibility. The advantage of  the private sector in 
our niche areas of  expertise is that we can offer 
a capability that is responsive, cost effective and 
highly current and capable, such as individual 
staff members with cumulative deployed 
operational experience which runs over many 
years. This experience remains current and is only paid for 
when it is needed – with none of  the contingent liabilities 
that accrue to Regular Army or full-time civil servants and 
diplomats. It is worth noting that civilian experts deployed 
in Peace Support Teams are considerably cheaper than their 
Regular Army counterparts.
Institutional memory and contextual 
understanding – alignment 
Beyond defence, HMG operates a highly-decentralised 
approach to programming for stability using CSSF. With 
the National Security Council setting broad objectives and 
agreeing budgetary allocations on a regional or country-
specific basis, detailed decisions on what is to be done where 
are delegated to cross-HMG regional boards and country 
missions. Given the critical importance of  institutional 
memory and local contextual understanding, it would make 
sense to look at how regional capability can be generated and 
maintained in strategically important regions. 
Urban myths
In the past, the deployment of  civilian capability has 
frequently become mired in debates around duty of  care 
in volatile security environments. Civilians are considered 
fragile and inflexible and unwilling to deploy to FCAS. It is 
worth noting that civilian teams often include former Regular 
soldiers and current Reservists are routinely deployed by 
organisations in operating environments deemed too insecure 
to deploy UK civil servants or indeed soldiers. This means 
that private development organisations often have reach 
and influence in places that are largely inaccessible to wider 
HMG. Taking advantage of  this benefit within the context of  
joint partnerships, it offers potential to transform the impact 
of  UK-funded stabilisation and peace-building work. Other 
issues that get in the way of  joint working include security and 
IT systems. The UK experience on Ops Herrick and Telic has 
demonstrated that it is entirely feasible to use appropriately 
cleared individuals within the context of  a shared platform to 
execute common goals by capitalising on different disciplines.
In the past, the 
deployment of  
civilian capability 
has frequently 
become mired in 
debates around 
duty of  care in 
volatile security 
environments. 
Civilians are 
considered fragile 
and inflexible and 
unwilling to deploy 
to fragile and conflict 
afflicted states
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TOWARDS A WHOLE FORCE APPROACH
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This paper summarises early thinking on the Whole Force 
Approach (WFA), recognising both the necessity and difficulty 
of  making WFA viable; and offers potential areas for further 
engagement.
What is the Whole Force Approach?
Military operations have always required a close relationship 
between industry and the Armed Forces, both at home and 
abroad. The levels of  civil involvement have waxed and waned 
but in essence the relationship has been contractual with a 
service provider undertaking to deliver output against a given 
demand. However, today’s political and economic climate 
is shaping the environment in a manner that necessitates a 
markedly different relationship between defence,17 industry 
and broader society. In short, an enterprise paradigm is sought, 
based on a partnership of  equals, not the traditional relationship 
of  customer and supplier. Boundaries are thus blurring and 
interdependencies increasing.18 Whilst offering much potential 
benefit, WFA has, from inception, lacked defined and agreed 
structures or outcomes. Meanwhile, in response to their own 
imperatives, industry and front-line commands are beginning 
to explore their own requirements; some adopting a clean-sheet 
approach to the ‘Defence Enterprise’ while others seem to view 
WFA as only an extension of  existing engineering, maintenance 
and logistic support arrangements. A more coherent approach 
from all parties would allow significantly improved focus on the 
desired outcome.
Why a Whole Force Approach?
Stakeholders will be driven by varying imperatives. But at 
the core, at least from a defence perspective, is a desire to 
accelerate the development of  a true contingent posture by:
l Improving the resource effectiveness of  combat 
service support and wider support activity.
l Better utilising uniformed personnel (i.e. the creation  
of  combat mass by a shift of  uniformed liability from  
tail to teeth).
l Making available nationally-scarce skills 
from a single enterprise resource at the point 
of  need without unnecessary duplication   
between government and industry.
l More effective and rewarding use of  Reserves.
Necessary but difficult?
WFA would benefit from increased and specific focus in 
both government and industry. For instance, whilst a lot 
has been done on a uni- or multilateral basis, there is still 
no single model on which to base further development and 
no agreed scope of  activity. Particularly, we are not aware 
of  any examination of  the management of  the inherent 
tension between profit (industry), combat power (defence/
military) and public perception (politics). This is important 
as it represents the key to making WFA work. Observation 
suggests that many structures badged today as Whole Force 
or enhanced contractor logistic support are little more than 
extensions of  the traditional contractor model. And, whilst the 
US contractor model is often cited as the ‘end point’ for a UK 
WFA, there is no mention of  the inherent differences that will 
intrude on this aim.19 For a WFA to work effectively will require 
a relationship built on trust, not only between government and 
17Defence – the uniformed Armed Services and the MoD structure and personnel that 
support them.
18This presents a fundamental challenge to the western, liberal concept of  war that has for 
the past 300 years attempted to separate the citizen from the soldier.
Indicative selection of WFA limiting factors:
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industry, but also between industrial partners. lt is probable 
that, in many cases, the decider-provider model will need to be 
managed differently with consultation and involvement at all 
stages of  the process. The use of  a third party trusted by both 
‘sides’ of  the relationship may be of  benefit.
How may WFA work for the UK?
ln essence a Whole Force model is one in which the defence 
enterprise shifts in emphasis and approach to see industry 
delivering some, much or all of  the functions that have 
traditionally fallen to uniformed personnel. The degree to 
which this is acceptable will be determined by risk appetite 
(physical, commercial or presentational) of  all parties involved. 
Work has begun to examine these inherent tensions to develop 
a theory of  what may be ‘normal’ within a WFA (i.e. what 
‘works’ under defined circumstances) and can thus be used 
as a basis for further thinking and development.20 A WFA 
can bring resource and thus financial benefits. But it does 
not follow that greater efficiency (by exchanging uniformed 
for non-uniformed personnel and services) will always be 
beneficial. There will be a point at which the positive resource 
impact of  WFA will begin to have a negative impact on 
combat power. Determining this point will be critical. The 
model left illustrates this point, suggesting a series of  limiting 
factors which together will combine to suggest the viable limits 
of  adopting a WFA across a variety of  potential, themed 
activities. Although embryonic, this idea could be worked up 
quickly to become a more structured foundation for future 
engagement and policy decision making.
What are the limits of  WFA?
Against the themes adopted in the model above, activity 
delivered under a WFA banner could vary from traditional 
support to the delivery of  lethal force.21 The extent to which 
government will be prepared to request or sanction activity 
will depend largely on risk appetite.
The Reserve Forces community
MoD sees Reservists as a key element of  WFA and also as 
a way of  reducing their skills shortages, but Reserve Forces 
(specifically at junior/junior officer rank and in engineering 
disciplines) are also heavily undermanned. 
A more coherent approach to the management of  the 
enterprise should see Reserve Forces utilised more effectively 
between their industrial and MoD employer and to the 
benefit of  the individual. Where no current Reserve Force 
employment model applies, all interested parties should 
support further work to ensure that defence is able to utilise 
the individual and communal skills developed in industry, 
whilst maintaining commercial propriety.
Next steps
The community that together forms ‘the Defence Enterprise’ 
should:
l Engage in further dialogue contributing to the  
conceptual development of  a WFA.
l Continue the development of  specific WFA initiatives  
within, for example, the Joint Helicopter Command and 
counter-IED community. 
l Undertake detailed work to unlock identified 
pinch points – e.g. the commercial framework – in 
which a WFA must operate.
l Undertake a comprehensive examination of  the skills 
management across the Defence Enterprise encompassing 
both MoD and industrial perspectives.
21As per static defence/force protection activity delivered by private military security 
companies under ‘ROE’ akin to JSP365. 
19The UK and US are culturally different, the linkage between Government/the Armed 
Forces and civil society are markedly divergent and the acceptance of  industrial involvement 
in military activity is subject to a very different set of  norms.
20‘Works’ – delivers resource efficiency that enhances generation/delivery of  fighting power. 
‘Defined circumstances’ – risk factors drawn from policy law and context. 
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OPTIMISING THE ARMY FOR EFFECT: 
EXPLOITING THE WHOLE FORCE APPROACH FOR 
NEW, BETTER OR MORE EFFICIENT CAPABILITY
With the added focus in this Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR) of  increasing productivity and innovation, 
defence is striving even harder to bring Lord Levene’s 2011 
recommendation, to implement a Whole Force Concept, to 
life. Indeed, the Secretary of  State has directed a shift from 
‘Concept to Approach’; from talking to walking a WFA. 
CGS wants to jog. Increased productivity and innovation are 
central to the Army’s SDSR proposition and its modernisation 
plans. However, the Army has yet to codify ‘how’ it will 
harness the full potential of  a WFA and deliver new, better or 
more efficient capability, whether future capability or better 
assuring the Whole Force it relies on today, both in barracks 
and on operations. This short paper lays out the Army’s early 
thoughts on how it might realise the potential of  a WFA.
 
First, an Army Whole Force is not new. Much of  
Wellington’s success in the 
Peninsula campaign was 
founded upon the Whole 
Logistics Force he created, 
including the equivalent of  
Treasury officials in his baggage 
trains! Recently, contractors 
have been an integral, and 
largely successful, component of  
the UK’s force in Afghanistan 
making up nearly 40 per cent of  
the UK’s headcount. Analysis 
of  future deployments of  a 
medium-scale deployment 
suggests an 8,000 strong Joint 
Expeditionary Force would 
be supported by at least 1,000 
contractors. 
Today, the British Army employs 
a WF mix in barracks, at 
contingency and on operations 
in areas such as: training (e.g. 
RSME Holdfast), recruiting 
(through Capita), facilities 
management (with Aspire), support capabilities (such as 
Babcock DSG), extending out to operational capabilities (such 
as the Heavy Equipment Transport partnership with KBR/
Fastrax). 
So the challenge for the Army is not to build a WF. Rather 
it is to move from the current ‘ad hoc’ WF growth to a more 
‘systematic’ policy-driven WFA; institutionalising Reserves, 
civil servants and industry as force components linked to 
Army outputs; a Whole Force by design. 
 
Of  course despite the increasing delegations enjoyed, the Army 
sits within defence’s WFA strategy, policy and governance 
which is simultaneously maturing. Nonetheless, and with 
defence supplier partners, defence has laid out a WF vision:
“Effective, agile and resilient capability delivered by an integrated, pre-
planned and affordable mix of  Regular and Reserve military, civilian and 
industry resources as a first choice to meet defence outputs.”
 
The supporting policy position is ‘light touch’ and is 
congealing around four tenets; that a WFA will be capability-
led, policy-enabled and commercially supported; that there is 
no template for an optimum WF mix and single Services are 
best placed to design this mix with the MoD driving cultural 
and policy change to maximise our freedoms; that it should 
be focused on operational outputs rather than efficiencies 
per se; and that WFA is a ‘bingo’ word, much used but little 
understood across either the department or industry and 
badly needs its lexicon to be defined, perhaps through some 
joint doctrine.  
 
For the Army, this provides a real opportunity to improve 
its return of  investment in its manpower, so increasing 
productivity. As well as being its strategic edge, manpower 
is its most expensive asset. By viewing human capability 
through the lens of  both military-effect and business-return, 
in a balance-of-investment framework similar to the Army’s 
equipment programme, there is a genuine opportunity to 
optimise the Army’s force mix for greater effect. As Napoleon 
said of  his soldiers, the moral is to the physical as three is to 
one, although it is unlikely he was considering cost in that 
equation! In today’s Army we must.     
 
But, and there is a but, a pre-planned, affordable Army WF 
programme, which genuinely has as first choice ‘military 
where necessary and civilian where it can’, will require the 
Army to unlock three fundamental barriers. Firstly, people 
freedoms. The key constraints of  manpower headcount 
and people policies; accepting that the former is about 
political appetite and the latter is complicated by legislation 
and defence’s ability to unlock the promise that flexible 
engagements offers. Secondly, cultural friction. Soldiers 
and commanders – indeed the nation – see uniformed and 
Regular manpower as ‘first choice’ for Army capabilities. 
Cap-badge interests can increase this cultural WF reticence. 
Thirdly, gaps in how we run the Army as a business. An Army 
WFA would benefit from clear governance and supporting 
mechanisms; a more systemic and persistent engagement 
with industry to unlock the partnering relationships crucial to 
a WFA, and a strategic manpower planning mechanism on 
which to base WF decisions. 
 
Key to overcoming these barriers will be a powerful narrative 
that explains the change. Underpinning a core-maxim of  
‘civilian where possible, military where necessary’, the building 
blocks of  an Army WFA narrative might sound like:
 
‘Sharpening the bayonet not replacing it’. Whilst 
industry will be integrated throughout much of  the British 
Army’s capability, it will not be employed in core direct 
combat roles.  
By viewing human 
capability through 
the lens of  both 
military-effect and 
business-return, 
in a balance-
of-investment 
framework similar 
to the British 
Army’s equipment 
programme, 
there is a genuine 
opportunity to 
optimise the 
Army’s force mix 
for greater effect 
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‘Industry as a force multiplier’. WFA is not about 
redundancies or necessarily reducing military manpower. It is 
about exploiting the talent civilians and contractors can bring 
to many areas of  our business and so allowing our soldiers to 
concentrate on their core-business; soldiering.
 
‘Non-deployable, firm-base first’. WFA efforts 
should be focused and proven in the firm-base first, before 
expanding into the deployed space – you simply cannot surge 
trust on operations.
 
‘Pan-Defence Lines of  Development, pan-capability’. 
WFA is more than logistic enablers and it is more than just a 
force mix of  people types. Opportunities will be developed 
across all capabilities, functions and lines of  development whilst 
recognising that the supporting functions are likely to provide 
the greatest opportunities.
 
‘Commanders’ business’.  Industry must be a fully-
integrated part of  the force both in barracks, on operations 
and on contingency. Commanders must engage with industry; 
they are part of  the solution not a contractual minefield.
 
This narrative must be linked to credible achievable 
benefits; again the language of  business. The WFA offers 
genuine opportunities to improve the Army’s productivity 
by focusing military personnel on their primary roles, to 
re-invest liability elsewhere and to enhance the integration 
of  Reservists between industry and the Army. Of  all three 
Services, perhaps the Army has the most to benefit? Equally, 
capitalising on both industry innovation and the ‘Reference’ 
status the British Army has earned, a WFA with industry 
can in partnership create new military capability which 
simultaneously supports the aims of  the Defence Growth 
Partnership and the national prosperity agenda. Two for the 
price of  one.
So the implementation of  the WFA is fundamental to the 
Army’s modernisation and innovation agenda, particularly 
the Army’s workforce productivity – how to work smarter.  
Optimising the Army for military effect through greater 
innovation (helped by industry) and improving productivity 
of  our strategic workforce (through the right force mix) is the 
end game. Fundamental to unlocking these benefits will be a 
new institutionalised and persistent relationship with industry 
across the AOM and a better strategic view of  the Army’s WF 
mix of  people and re-balancing choice. Incentivising good WF 
behaviour and developing a powerful narrative to explain the 
change will be key to unlocking the full WF potential across 
the Army and defence.
Whole Force Approach is not about redundancies or necessarily reducing military manpower. 
It is about exploiting the talent civilians and contractors can bring to many areas of  our 
business and so allowing our soldiers to concentrate on their core-business; soldiering 
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TOWARDS A UK DEFENCE WHOLE FORCE 
APPROACH: DEFINING THE CHALLENGE
The recent British Army sharp focus on defining a whole 
force approach (WFA) is necessary and overdue. The ‘Whole 
Force Concept’ was trailed in the 2010 Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), yet it was not codified in a written 
MoD or Army ‘concept’; it has therefore been open to wide 
interpretation. Lacking an imperative or a champion, progress 
since 2010 has been slow. Maj Gen Abraham (in his Army 
2020 Reserves capacity at an MoD briefing) commented: 
“Turkeys don’t vote for Christmas” – i.e. those charged with 
defining the WF and turning it into an actual approach had 
lacked an incentive to push ahead. As a result, five years on, 
core assumptions about what industry might be asked to do, 
or could do, and the risks it might be willing to underwrite, 
are neither defined nor tested. With imminent pressures 
likely to arise from SDSR15, which put the WFA as a major 
theme and the Regular front-line ‘teeth’ of  the Army 2020 
design obviously in need of  reinforcement from a capped pool 
of  manpower, time to set boundaries, define requirements, 
produce models and explore opportunities and risks (including 
from an industry perspective), is short. In this context, it would 
be useful to set out a shared industry/military WF narrative 
and examine how successful Sponsored Reserves (SR) and 
other WF models might be replicated.
 
To help inform a wider discussion, however, there is an urgent 
need for a short formal concept and ideally, endorsed ‘doctrine’ 
(i.e. an accepted body of  knowledge) ensuring that all potential 
parts of  the WF share an understanding before being asked 
to define their contributions. Given time imperatives, the 
significance in defence policy of  a WF and the strategic risks 
from poor decisions, scenario-based exercises could help to 
rapidly build common understanding and baseline assumptions. 
Unlike the Reserves Study – castigated by the National Audit 
Office for poorly-evidenced assertion and lack of  rigorous 
testing – the WFA in various configurations must be tested, if  
necessary to destruction. It must be refined with industry as full 
partners. Noting how often defence strategic direction has been 
breached (e.g. the double-Medium commitment), scenarios 
should be unconstrained by current policy or the Scenarios 
Assessment Group: useful scenarios must portray demanding 
hybrid conflict. They must also cross Service boundaries. 
The UK mounts, sustains and recovers from operations as a 
Joint Force. This Army initiative should ideally be adopted by 
MoD/Joint Forces Command to limit inter-Service divergence. 
However, a sensible quest for jointery should not delay Army 
progress, noting that the Royal Air Force has forged ahead with, 
for example, its air-to-air re-fuelling and that the Royal Navy 
has a long-standing WF support solution in the Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary.
 
And the WFA is not a new idea. During a recent US Army 
‘UNIFIED QUEST’ force development exercise, the extent of  
incremental ‘contractorisation’ of  support and combat service 
support came as a sharp surprise to most operations-focused 
US Army leaders. They were unaware of  the cumulative 
impact of  an informal WFA on core US warfighting 
capability. In our own relatively recent experience, the mortar-
hardened patrol bases in Ulster (so critical to campaign 
success) could not have been built and maintained without a 
local civil engineering firm, despite some being murdered by 
PIRA and continual intimidation. Would this company be 
considered part of  a modern UK WF and what is the extent 
to which a WF Concept/Approach has evolved – informally 
or otherwise – into a WF Reality? Indeed, what factors and 
characteristics define and delineate the different parts of  ‘the 
Force’? (Is a coach company bussing soldiers to Brize Norton 
part of  the ‘WF’?) What roles are essentially military (either 
Regular or Reservist) and what roles are essentially civilian, 
and why? Is the key issue for the Army the degree of  physical 
risk involved in achieving an assigned role; is it the degree of  
mission-criticality devolved to an industry provider; and how 
important is the wearing of  uniform?
 
The uniform issue is code for confidence, ‘cultural fit’ and 
commitment, and raises questions of  the guarantee. It is about 
whether a member of  the non-military WF (or the parent 
company) can be compelled, under any and all conditions, 
to provide the contracted service. If  so, is there a suitable 
legislative framework and are SR the most flexible way of  
pushing the boundaries towards a different WFA? Is the long-
standing (and Army-defining) notion of  ‘unlimited liability’ 
actually a robust start-point for WF doctrine, given the 
intrusion of  human rights law (the uniformed Serviceman’s 
right to life) onto the battlefield? Would the Army consider 
re-introducing a ‘limited liability’ WF model for partner 
organisations and individuals, as in the early 20th century 
Territorial Force, where unit roles were specified ‘UK-only’? 
(Coastal Artillery had a combat role, but only for local defence 
and with a guarantee that Territorials would not be sent 
abroad against their will). A similar model (e.g. allowing those 
with minor ailments such as asthma into the ‘home-only’ SR) 
might increase the personnel pool; it could reduce the risk 
to service delivery in a national crisis; it might allow more 
flexible planned use of  Regulars and fully-fit Reservists for 
deployed combatant tasks; and by bounding the risk it might 
incentivise industry to accept some of  the overhead of  holding 
(‘sponsoring’) a Reservist cadre.
 
Recruiting Reservists has not been easy, though. Will SR 
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Approach in action: RFA Argus pictured arriving in Sierra Leone during Operation Gritrock, 
the UK’s response to fighting Ebola in the region. 
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(perhaps as Contractors on Training (COT)) be seen as 
second-rate replacements for Regular manpower or ‘proper’ 
Reservist troops? Top-level direction and support may 
not be enough if  the scale of  the WF change challenges 
established organisational culture. There is also a paradox 
that Contractors On Deployed Operations (CONDO) is 
now accepted and unremarkable, whereas COT solutions in 
peacetime force generation are still seen in some quarters as a 
red line. Would the Army consider even more radical solutions 
such as joint Army/industry command and control of  SR in 
peacetime, with shared decision-making on promotion and 
career development, or wider use of  industry in specialist and 
continuity HQ staff appointments? These are the sorts of  
steps (suitably incentivised) that might ensure a different force 
mix – especially of  highly-skilled trades and managers – which 
could deliver a different WF teeth/tail ratio, inform staffs and 
provide insight. Is the military secretariat flexibly-minded 
enough to explore such HR practices or is the established 
model set in stone?
 
So, adopting a significantly different WF model may offer 
an Army hemmed in with significant organisational and 
manpower constraints (e.g. the 82,000 Regular manpower cap) 
the potential to use its military manpower where it is most 
needed; and may offer industry the potential to bid to provide 
services that are currently restricted to Service personnel. 
However, the wider MoD would need to adjust behaviours 
accordingly. Expansion of  the WFA to deliver a sustainable 
solution (i.e. operationally and commercially-viable) will likely 
fail if  it is run purely on a manpower substitution or narrow 
pricing ‘Value for Money’ (VFM) basis. Those writing the 
contracts and evaluating the offers from industry need to 
assess ‘Value for Effect’ (VFE). A viable, robust solution must 
incorporate affordability; assured provision of  a known quality 
and quantity of  output, especially Suitably Qualified and 
Experienced Person (SQEP); and also a set of  factors around 
price and longevity of  ‘the deal’ that makes this viable to all 
stakeholders – including industry’s shareholders.
 
Finally, some words on risk. In the case of  our Army and 
UK industry, informal and formal assumptions will influence 
risk appetites. One such is ‘lines of  support’, a view of  the 
battlespace which implicitly assumes a Second World War/
Cold War ‘front’ and a relatively safer ‘rear area’. A variation 
on this assumption is of  a ‘rear area’ akin to Camp Bastion.  
A related notion is a ‘mature’ campaign becomes more 
stable, allowing a progressively higher ratio of  Reservists and 
CONDO to Regular manpower: this particular assumption 
has endured, despite experience to the contrary in Iraq, where 
the security situation in the supposedly safe ‘rear’ operating 
base deteriorated over time. Are these extant and, if  so, valid 
assumptions, noting that recent Russian doctrine says that 
critical infrastructure such as ports may be struck early, and 
with modernised tactical nuclear weapons?
 
Military risk also lies in the assured delivery of  a more tightly-
defined ‘force’ – i.e. a formed, flexible, disciplined and SQEP 
body of  ‘sponsored’ personnel at known readiness, to whom 
orders can be given within politically-tolerable and legally-
codified boundaries, up to (but not always necessarily) fulfilling 
their role under direct threat, where the acid test of  putting 
‘mission before man’ applies. At this end of  the WF spectrum, 
the realities of  industry participation must be closely aligned 
to the notion of  ‘service’. A risk for industry is that it will 
hold all of  the extra peacetime costs of  a manpower solution 
without the contract acknowledging the additional costs of  
an on-call service; and that whilst the roles of  the SR may be 
defined, they will still be so broad as to make the commitment 
(e.g. for the duration of  a mobilisation, or even repeat tours 
throughout an enduring operation) open-ended.
 
Conclusion
 
Most of  the issues and questions set out above can be resolved. 
But one problem stands out: can the MoD actually contract for 
a true WF capability on anything other than an ad hoc, lowest 
price basis? As with the Reserves footprint (or the structure of  
the infantry) experience points to a few, larger, partner/sponsor 
organisations being selected, especially for assured SR solutions, 
according to a matched organisational ethos. They would in 
effect become part of  UK’s critical national infrastructure. 
According to this logic, they would qualify on the basis of  their 
record and resilience; i.e. their demonstrable ability to sustain a 
guaranteed level of  readiness, with minimal upheaval, from the 
very moment when a new operation is called.
 
If  SR and CONDO, or even COT, are to play a much 
greater role in future force generation and operations, then 
that implies that highly-skilled personnel will be held in such 
critical mass organisations. Qualifying parts of  (prosperity 
agenda supporting British) industry will need to invest in a 
‘contingent force generation capability’. Logically (as with 
rationalising Army Reserve Centres and basing new Reservist 
units on viable population clusters) this implies partnering 
with carefully screened organisations. This model would be 
viable if  the volume of  core-related work exists in peacetime 
e.g. via COT, to sustain the SR/CONDO latent operational 
capability. How, though, will the cost of  holding a dormant 
SR/CONDO/COT capability be apportioned, or is it 
assumed that industry will simply bear the full liability? The 
WF is not a free force. Real and opportunity costs will need to 
be factored into contracts and peacetime roles.
 
It is difficult, however, to see how the MoD would presently 
set up a commercial deal with such providers (even assuming 
they are UK companies). Is there a commercial model that 
can result in mutually-viable (and for industry, that does mean 
profitable) deals, with credible partners, to support a more 
ambitious WFA? The trend in Whitehall and Abbey Wood 
(where contracts are drafted) seems to be towards shorter 
contracts with more transactional, rather than partnering, 
behaviours. The norm appears to be for the MoD to compete 
whenever it can, rather than prioritise more stable, strategic 
support partnerships. Industry can adapt to either model, but 
the force design rhetoric (‘partnership/VFE’) and the present 
realities (‘transactional/VFM’) seem to be contradictory, 
adding extra risk to a more ambitious WFA. In addressing 
this, Army HQ and Abbey Wood will need to be closely 
aligned, not least to secure the support of  arbiters in the MoD 
and Cabinet Office.
A risk for industry is that it will hold all of  the 
extra peacetime costs of  a manpower solution 
without the contract acknowledging the 
additional costs of  an on-call service
“”
ares&athena / investigating the whole force approach / 22
PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN 
THE WHOLE FORCE APPROACH
The Whole Force Approach (WFA) has been identified 
as a foundation for the future development of  the British 
Army. The WFA will feature organisational innovations that 
draw military and civilian expertise together to create novel 
military capabilities. The experience, at times fairly bitter, 
of  more than two decades of  Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
and outsourcing in pursuit of  ‘value for money’ (VFM) has 
certainly made the Army a much more astute commercial 
actor. Officers and civil servants alike have become more 
adept at managing contractual relationships. However, much 
of  this experience has been the pursuit of  spending less 
money on a tightly-defined minimum military requirement 
(frequently dressed up as VFM), mainly through manpower 
substitution. 
However, the WFA is seeking to move well beyond VFM. 
The WFA seeks to strengthen the operational potential of  
the Army by joining with industry partners to widen and 
deepen military capabilities and improve the resilience of  the 
Army 2020 design. Capital investment can be shared with, 
or borne solely by, the business partner who can also utilise 
the inherently cheaper capitation rate of  its personnel over 
the life of  a contract (even if  
activating the personnel may 
incur relatively high costs). 
This aspiration will require 
commercial relationships 
to be re-thought and new 
understandings shared between 
the Army and its commercial 
partners.
This short paper will examine 
two aspects of  the possible 
future partnership relationship 
between the Army and its 
business partners under the 
WFA. First the need for continual innovation over the life of  a 
partnership will be considered, followed by an examination of  
the issues of  organisational cultures. 
Moving beyond the transactional: 
partnerships and innovation
The Army’s use of  contractors and outsourcing providers 
has become more successful as the role of  the ‘intelligent 
customer’ has been developed. The bilateral and 
transactional client-provider relationship is based on 
specified performance standards, penalty clauses and 
frequent re-competition to keep the provider keen and 
responsive to the needs of  the client. Change in performance 
conditions during the contract period can be sluggish, 
problematic and costly, however. The many stories of  the 
difficulty and costs of  minor variations under PFI contracts 
(perhaps exemplified by the possibly apocryphal case of  the 
Christmas tree in MoD head office that cost several hundred 
pounds) illustrate the type of  rigidly-defined relationships 
which would undermine the WFA in its infancy.
The WFA should avoid the stasis of  the transactional static 
contract. To be successful, armies are required to innovate 
and learn from experience, codifying the results of  this process 
in doctrine and teaching in the training establishment. Under 
the WFA, the performance of  business partners should be 
responsive to changing land force doctrine, with the partner 
accepting an adaptability that mirrors the Army’s doctrinal 
learning process (and, indeed, being invited to contribute to 
this process). When faced with adaptive adversaries, the WF 
cannot afford for its response to be dictated by the rhythm of  
contract renewals. 
This need for dynamism is unlikely to be alien to WFA 
business partners, however. Innovation and adaptability are 
inherent qualities for a successful business. The pressure of  
daily and weekly sales figures, and quarterly financial results, 
creates a need for constant adaptation. A business that is not 
a well-refined learning organisation is unlikely to continue 
to operate for long. The Army needs to harness this spirit of  
commercial flexibility, possibly by contracting for effects and 
outputs and drawing the commercial partner into shared 
innovation within the partnership arrangement.
Innovation invariably carries a cost, however. Sunk costs 
may need to be written off as doctrine changes, and 
new investments made. The conundrum for commercial 
relationships under the WFA is to enable the partnership 
to have the necessary flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances without sacrificing VFM as the industrial 
partner builds the cost of  flexibility into the pricing. 
Long-term contractual relationships provide a means 
of  compensating the commercial provider for taking on 
the additional costs of  being a full partner to the Army, 
sharing not just the operational role but the learning and 
developmental roles that underpin it.
Partnership and cultural incompatibilities
Partnerships under the WFA imply a shared and mutually 
embraced identity if  relationships are to move beyond the 
transactional. The Army is a bounded profession, with 
significant barriers to entry and dominant culturally-shared 
beliefs that are spread through the socialisation of  its members 
during their training and early years of  service. The Army’s 
organisational culture underpins the moral component of  
its fighting power and is considered to be invaluable to its 
effectiveness. 
The Army’s organisational culture might also be seen as a 
barrier to partnerships under the terms of  the WFA. The 
Army’s officers may see themselves as ‘serving to lead’ and 
see their commercial partners as ‘leading to profit’. In their 
turn, commercial partners without the credibility afforded 
by military service may find themselves confronted by 
condescension, real or imagined. The chronic failure of  
attempts to inculcate a ‘One Army’ concept to overcome 
cultural barriers between the Regular and Territorial armies 
indicates the scale of  the task ahead if  military-commercial 
Commercial 
partners without the 
credibility afforded 
by military service 
may find themselves 
confronted by 
condescension, real 
or imagined
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partnering is to achieve the returns that are being sought.
Are WFA partnerships destined to founder due to a 
fundamental incompatibility of  ethos, sinking back into a 
transactional relationship? Or, does embracing the WFA 
pose risks to the Army’s identity? The ‘unlimited liability’ 
of  military service requires military personnel to accept a 
fundamentally skewed contractual relationship with the Army. 
Can such a relationship be extended to WFA partnerships and 
how readily would ‘lateral entrants’ (mid-career executives 
recruited into the Army to fill middle-rank officer positions) 
accept and profess such an employment relationship?
In its haste to embrace the benefits of  the WFA, under 
short-term budgetary pressure, the Army may be guilty 
of  consigning the knotty problems of  identity and ethos 
into ‘downstream’ issues. However, if  these issues are not 
addressed relationships will remain transactional, defined by 
performance standards and costly variation agreements that 
leave neither party satisfied, and partnerships will remain 
hollow.
‘Caveat emptor’ still applies
There are valid budgetary and organisational reasons to 
move quickly towards the adoption of  the WFA, enabling the 
Army to gain the benefits of  the 2020 structure. However, 
there are equally good reasons to take time to ensure that the 
partnering relationships are carefully evolved and that shared 
understandings are developed with business partners. 
Long-term service contracts and partnerships without the 
need for frequent re-competition are ‘manna from heaven’ for 
defence service providers. As land force capital budgets look 
set to flat-line across Europe, companies are looking to service 
provision contracts to maintain turnover. The medium- to 
long-term nature of  service contracts (especially if  packaged 
as ‘partnerships’) is very attractive as profits can be booked 
into the future rather than concentrated into a few years as 
normally occurs in capital projects. 
The success of  involving business partners with the WFA 
will stand or fall on the nature of  the partnerships that are 
developed. Partnerships that are sufficiently responsive to 
changing conditions, and which are compatible with the 
Army’s ethos and identity, are needed, and both these subjects 
are conducive to further research. Bilateral and transactional 
relationships could be considered as simply part of  the 
physical component of  fighting power, but the partnerships 
sought under the WFA will need to be considered under all 
three components – moral, conceptual and physical – if  the 
Army’s fighting power is to properly enhanced.
Innovation and adaptability are inherent qualities for a successful business. The pressure 
of  daily and weekly sales figures, and quarterly financial results, creates a need for constant 
adaptation – the Army needs to harness this spirit of  commercial flexibility
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THE WHOLE FORCE APPROACH – A PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE USE OF VOLUNTEER RESERVES
In re-defining a future strategy in the defence sector, the 
question was posed to the Joint Forces Command (JFC) 
team “how can we, a key, long-standing partner and the 
MoD work together to deliver better value for defence?”. 
In exploring this question through our annual Defence 
and Security Information Circle (DSIC), the overriding 
conclusion from both industry and MoD was through a 
combination of  ‘partnering’ and ‘support to the Reserve’. 
In his foreword to the subsequent DSIC White Paper, 
Commander JFC wrote: 
“We now need to harness today’s technology to stay at the cutting edge of  
defence capability and maintain a position of  strength. But we’re not there 
yet. We can only achieve this if  we work better together, if  we move fast, 
in commissioning, procurement and deployment but also if  we recognise 
the advantages that new technologies will bring. On top of  that, we need 
imaginative ways of  thinking. Strengthening our Reservist force will help 
to harness the specialist technical expertise available in civil society and 
ensure we have the necessary skills to match the changing commitments 
required of  the Armed Forces”.
Many corporate organisations are rightly proud of  being 
active supporters of  the UK Armed Forces and of  bringing 
the MoD’s Corporate Covenant to life; where this works best 
it is driven top-down from the board. Support spans events 
such as the Invictus Games and the annual UK Armed 
Forces Day, SSAFA and Combat Stress and fundraising and 
volunteering to support these and other military charities. 
It includes the employment of  veterans and hundreds of  
Reservists, including through transition programmes which 
uses ex-Service employees to help Service leavers move 
smoothly into work. It is recognised that veteran and Reservist 
employees bring skills, behaviours and values that are 
important and an exceptional ability to learn new skills; 
they’re comfortable with challenging situations and 
places. 
Specifically, ties to the Army Reserve offer opportunity and 
mutual advantage. As an example, BT supports 81 Signal 
Squadron, a specialist Army Reserve sub-unit (distinct from 
Sponsored Reserves) that 
recruits skilled and experienced 
telecommunications engineers. 
These Reservists are trained 
and deployed in support of  
MoD fixed communications 
infrastructure in the UK and 
across the globe, providing both 
defence and BT with a clear 
and significant benefit through 
transferable skills and technical 
capability. This relationship has 
developed over 50 years and has 
worked with MoD to align skills 
to the extent that the military 
training burden is reduced. All 
ranks are recruited nationwide, 
the squadron is fully manned, 
with 140 personnel, 65 per cent 
being current BT employees and 15 per cent being ex-BT 
employees who have moved elsewhere, but remain with the 
squadron. The affiliation is further strengthened with the 
current officer commanding of  81 Sig Sqn employed as the 
Head of  Military Engagement in BT, and the squadron’s 
honorary colonel typically being a senior company executive, 
currently the President, Public and Government Affairs.  
This successful relationship has been achieved thorough 
an approach to collaborative manning, where a shared 
need and joint outcomes have driven the right behaviours 
to deliver skills on operations, training and within the 
fixed base. These 
requirements have 
also driven mutual 
and continued 
engagement 
with the MoD’s 
Career Transition 
Partnership.  
Why is this important within the 
context of  the Whole Force Approach 
(WFA)? There are a series of  factors that 
have enabled the success of  collaborative 
manning within 81 Signal Squadron that might 
indicate how to take forward aspects of  the WFA:
l  A clear strategic relationship.
l  A common purpose and intent that aligns   
 operational outcomes and therefore benefits.
l  An agreement to share risk.
l  Flexibility and adaptability.
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l  A sense of  identify which fits the culture, values and  
 standards of  both organisations.
Long-term success of  the WFA concept must not be based on 
a purely commercial or transactional relationship. Too much 
is at stake for both organisations in terms of  reputation and 
credibility for such an undertaking to be solely a ‘business’ 
undertaking. This approach is enabled by the continued 
board-level visibility and support that the activity is afforded 
and the strategic relationship that exists with MoD and Her 
Majesty’s Government.  
The 81 Signal Squadron model has recently relied heavily 
on the mutually reinforcing mechanism of  Service leavers 
with telecommunications skills leaving Regular service to 
join a telecommunications company with an outlet to re-
engage with their former life. These aligned operational and 
personal outcomes enable industry to benefit from the skills, 
experience and training the MoD has provided, which reduces 
training burden and speed to full productivity; in return, the 
MoD has a re-engagement mechanism for Reservists who are 
fully trained. Is this the type of  model that WFA seeks, one 
in which the organisation engaged has a depth and breadth 
of  long-term experience in a directly-aligned skills set; or 
is the MoD prepared to use an ‘outsourcing’ model where 
manpower is provided by ‘specialist suppliers’ who are not 
necessarily undertaking the same role and function from a 
corporate perspective?
Industry has seen the benefit of  a ‘shared risk’ model 
through the reduction in mandated training days, reducing 
the burden on the individual while guaranteeing a level of  
capability; this understanding is important. There is also 
a clear understanding that deployed civilian personnel do 
not bear arms (when employed as Volunteer and Sponsored 
Reserves called up under relevant legislation they are of  
course counted as serving). Through close and continual 
engagement, industry and the MoD are able to show 
flexibility and adaptability. This has led to the adoption of  
a national model for Reserve recruitment and retention. As 
a result all troop-level groups are ‘virtual’, with little or no 
geographic connection. Indeed, most personnel rarely go to 
squadron headquarters and instead deploy direct to the task 
or training location. The question for WFA is how flexible 
and adaptable are the MoD prepared to be to achieve their 
aims; is the approach to have industry adopt MoD practices 
for the same outcome or for the MoD to adopt industry ones 
or will it be a hybrid? Resolving such contentious points will 
be key to WFA success.
Finally, and probably most importantly, the strong 
alignment of  culture, values and standards between the two 
organisations has allowed this Reserves model of  the WFA to 
flourish. This, in part, is due to history and the strong links 
between the two organisations, built over many decades. 
But it is also because as both organisations have developed, 
they have maintained a strong sense of  mutual respect and 
connection that has reinforced the worth of  continued 
support and shown that there is little conflict in purpose or 
vision. The question for WFA is whether this is an important 
factor or not; if  not then does price and outcome outweigh 
shared culture, values and standards? Who is the MoD 
prepared to work with and who not? Likewise industry must 
make its own decisions. 
It’s good to talk: BT’s long-standing association with 81 Signal Squadron, a specialist 
Reserve sub-unit, demonstrates the mutual benefits of  a collaborative approach to manning.
Is the Ministry of  Defence prepared to use an ‘outsourcing’ model where 
manpower is provided by ‘specialist suppliers’ who are not necessarily 
undertaking the same role and function from a corporate perspective?
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THE WHOLE FORCE APPROACH
– AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
The Whole Force Approach (WFA) presents both the 
MoD and industry with new opportunities to build more 
sophisticated and relevant models to deliver improved 
military effect. These opportunities have arisen as a 
result of  increasing technical sophistication, a need to be 
expeditionary, highly reactive, agile and flexible, and a 
backdrop of  severe fiscal pressures. Historically, WFA has 
focused on a blended workforce of  people; increasingly, it 
needs to focus on fewer people overall, and complementary 
technology to deliver the required outputs, and to achieve 
decisive combat mass.
Whilst the focus over recent years for WFA has been on the 
deployed space, WFA should start in the home base, with 
integrated workforces working together, training together, 
and then, when necessary, deploying together and fighting 
together. 
This gradation from routine to exceptional would help to 
build confidence, leading to trust; commanders, leaders, and 
managers would get to know their joint teams as they do in 
a wholly military organisation. This would enable industry 
to support the Army through the application of  innovation, 
investment and talent insertion, enabling integrated solutions 
which offer optimal value for money.  
MoD and industry red lines
There will be ‘red lines’ for the military element that should 
not be crossed and similarly for industry to enable them to 
discharge their duty of  care for employees. These constraints 
are small in number but are important principles:
l Industry personnel will not bear arms (except  
 Sponsored Reserves) in support of  UK MoD  
 operations.
l  Sponsored Reserves will only use arms for self- 
 protection/self-defence.
l  Sponsored Reserves will not engage in offensive  
 direct-action (‘stabbers’ business’).
l Companies will not contract with regimes and/or
  countries on the UK Sanctions, Embargoes and  
 Restrictions List (unless explicitly supporting UK  
 government projects/objectives).
Whilst these caveats may restrict industry engagement in some 
combat activities, most should be approached with an open 
mind to seek the best solution for defence. This could include 
roles up to and including services within the ‘kill chain’ where 
this makes sense to do so.
Essential ingredients
The essential ingredients for WFA include flexibility, 
understanding the commanders’ needs, the degree of  
flexibility required, and the ability to contract appropriately. 
The notion that WFA should not be seen as an additional 
element to supplement an ongoing operation; instead it should 
be viewed as an element of  an integrated team delivering  
military outputs in ‘peacetime’, with a deployable capability 
‘baked-in’ from the outset.
WFA already exists in a range of  components: Regulars, 
full-time Reserves, Sponsored Reserves, part-time Reserves 
and Contractors On Deployed Operations but this 
compartmentalisation of  the workforce is often unhelpful, and 
the development of  the concept of  a single workforce as a 
continuum, with individuals within it taking up commitments 
commensurate with the task they are required to perform and 
the individual’s appetite. 
One topical example of  how this might work is the Serco 
engineering technician team from RAF Northolt. Here, a 
‘spectrum approach’ has been taken where employees are 
aircraft technicians working in a hangar who, when required, 
deploy with the aircraft either under Contractor Support 
to Operations (CSO) or as Sponsored Reserves (SR) (with 
differing levels of  commitment) – completing their primary 
role – but under a different threat level. They are equipped 
with an appropriate level of  training and, commensurate with 
the threat, adopt an appropriate level of  self-protection. 
This sliding scale of  ‘conditions’ allows us to appropriately 
train our personnel, provides the military commander with 
maximum flexibility and assured delivery, and ensures that 
best value for money is maintained. 
However, for such a scheme to thrive, industry players need 
to commit to engage in this approach and affirm that they 
are prepared to enter this construct and accept the associated 
risks; without this commitment, the model risks failure at the 
very time it becomes of  critical importance. 
For such a scheme to thrive, industry players need to commit to engage in 
this approach and affirm that they are prepared to enter this construct and 
accept the associated risks; without this commitment, the model risks failure at 
the very time it becomes of  critical importance 
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Challenges – industry
Potentially putting employees in harm’s way, or having them 
deploy at short notice and possibly for extended periods, 
requires special terms and conditions of  employment, a high-
quality risk management system and unwavering commitment 
up to board level. Equally, appropriate support systems for 
families, associated training systems, assurance standards and 
insurances to satisfy duty of  care are essential. The corporate 
risk must be fully understood and mitigated and if  these 
aspects can be satisfied then full participation is achievable. 
This must be supported by HR processes that enable 
employees to be engaged appropriately, with the right skills, 
motivation and reward.
In recent campaigns the use of  contractors has been 
extensively under CSO with significant numbers deployed.  
SR deployment on the other hand has remained relatively 
few in number, at 60-120 per company, for the handful of  
companies involved in their provision. In order to gain the 
maximum benefit from WFA and to be able to utilise the 
‘spectrum approach’ previously described, the system must be 
scalable to provide the optimal balance.
Considerations for MoD
The Army must have primacy for deciding which critical 
military outputs can be supported by industry within WFA 
(though it may wish to consult), but more importantly those 
that cannot. In order to maintain the level of  flexibility 
required, the military commanders need to work ever more 
closely with their commercial colleagues to carefully articulate 
what exactly they need and expect. This in turn needs to be 
carefully but simply articulated in contractual language to 
ensure mutual success. 
Crucial to this approach will 
be much more open partnered 
dialogue to facilitate better 
solutions and ensure that assured 
delivery of  the right outputs, 
at the right time, with the right 
confidence can be achieved 
and to mitigate as many risks as 
possible. 
Summary
WFA is already a reality and 
is challenging. The further 
development of  a ‘spectrum’ of  
commitments by the Army and 
by industry presents some new 
exciting opportunities. Gaining 
a common understanding of  these opportunities, and close 
engagement between the Army and selected onshore industry 
partners who are willing and able to commit to the WFA, will 
potentially create a fused team to support the Army’s needs 
and deliver a better quality output at optimal cost; this is 
indeed a target worth chasing. 
The Army must 
have primacy for 
deciding which 
critical military 
outputs can be 
supported by 
industry within 
a Whole Force 
Approach, but more 
importantly those 
that cannot
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Spectrum approach: Under the terms of  a contract announced in May 2015, Serco engineers will continue to provide forward and depth maintenance for the BAe146 aircraft of  32 (The Royal) 
Squadron. The company has been delivering this service at RAF Northolt since 1995 and has been providing a broader multi-activity contract and engineering services there since 1997. The 
private and first-class passenger handling services available at Northolt are routinely used by British and foreign royalty, heads of  state, government ministers and senior military personnel.
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INDUSTRY INSIGHT
The UK was an early adopter of  the all-professional armed 
services. This model proved cost effective in sustaining our 
contribution to winning the Cold War and to resourcing the 
large number of  operations carried out until the present day. 
However, increasingly, it has become necessary to supplement 
Regular personnel on operations. In 2010, a number of  
factors led to the conclusion in the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), that adoption of  a Whole Force 
Concept (WFC) would be advantageous, if  not necessary, to 
reinforce Regular personnel on operations.
The modern practice of  coupling Regular Forces, Reserves, 
civil servants, Contractors Deployed on Operations 
(CONDO) and some limited numbers of  Sponsored Reserves 
started long before the 2010 SDSR. It was adopted piecemeal 
in order to fill gaps in military capacity and has slowly grown, 
not least under the pressure of  12 years of  continuous, 
relatively high-intensity, expeditionary operations. The 2010 
SDSR brought WFC into the foreground as a clear response 
to the challenges that UK defence was facing post the 2008 
financial crisis. But while there has been some progress in 
re-creating the Reserves and increasing embedded industrial 
footprint, for example Marchwood Military Port privatisation, 
it appears that progress towards WFC has been, at best, 
patchy and needs re-invigoration.
Key drivers of  Whole Force Approach
The UK took the lead in the western world by phasing 
out National Service from 1960. A number of  factors 
contributed to this landmark decision but a key driver 
was money. The smaller all-professional model was more 
affordable and seen to be more cost effective. But as time has 
gone by, the cost of  recruiting and sustaining professional 
manpower has risen faster than the available budget. 
Consequently, the number of  uniformed personnel in the 
UK forces has declined at an 
average rate of  2.5 per cent 
per year every year since 1945. 
Steep manpower reductions 
resulting from the 2010 SDSR 
were merely catching up with 
the long-term trend.
Assuming that the 2.5 per cent 
per year trend continues for 
as far as the eye can see, while 
defence and security policy 
continues to place similar 
demands on the Armed Forces, 
it is clear that defence needs 
to supplement professional 
military manpower. Some 
of  the solutions are likely to 
be technological. For example, autonomy in a range of  
applications can, and will, reduce the need for humans to 
undertake quite a few roles. But it seems inevitable that 
moving to a model where a number of  uniformed personnel 
are cheaper to employ because they are not full-time 
professionals will have a big part to play. In theory, it could go 
all the way to a militia-based force, as used by the Swiss, but 
we are probably some way from that for the foreseeable future 
– or are we?
The Reserves
Clearly the re-establishment of  the Reserves, and creation 
of  a new(ish) model for their recruitment and employment, 
is one way to supplement the limited numbers of  full-time 
professionals. Hence it is a key element of  WFC. However, 
there are issues that so far the MoD seems to have struggled to 
overcome. These include:
l Inability to recruit enough people to meet the  
 unambitious target of  30,000 Army Reserves.
l  Some inbuilt bias in the Services against Reserves  
 and their ability to operate alongside Regulars.
l Inability to come up with any sort of  construct that  
 compares with the US Reserves and National Guard  
 ability to deploy formed units, and even formations,  
 for long tours of  duty.
The civil service and public sector
The adoption of  cross-government approaches to many 
operational scenarios is likely to be increasingly important. 
But while the civil service and other public sector bodies such 
as the NHS and police have a range of  skills, these are not 
all-encompassing. Furthermore, there are limits to the number 
of  these people who can be taken off their day jobs, while 
continuing to provide required levels of  service.
Industry
Industry can play a significant role in WFA. It can provide 
CONDO support and, in some instances, Sponsored Reserves. 
Both have to be paid for when being used and Sponsored 
Reserves do have some small overhead cost to defence to train 
and retain outside operational commitments.
CONDO seems to be quite well understood now and is 
relatively easy to turn on and off. The issues are around 
what you can’t ask civilians to do in a war zone. Hence the 
Sponsored Reserve has the potential to fill the gap.
Assuming the definition of  a Sponsored Reserve is 
understood, the key benefits they can bring are:
l  Fully skilled for their technical role by their   
 employers at virtually no cost to the MoD.
l Subject to military discipline when activated.
l  Deployable into the combat zone.
l Can reduce operational risk for user and   
 maintainer skill fade.
That said, there are a number of  issues that have to be 
It seems inevitable 
that moving to 
a model where 
a number of  
uniformed personnel 
are cheaper to 
employ because they 
are not full-time 
professionals will 
have a big part 
to play
“”
resolved which include:
l  Having the right HR policy both in their parent  
 companies and in the Forces.
l Pay and rewards compatibility compared to Regular  
 Forces and Reserves.
l  Cost-effective provision of  adequate military training  
 for the types of  operation to be undertaken.
l  Satisfying the Army that Sponsored Reserves are  
 reducing operational risk and not increasing it.  
 This is probably about targeting the right things for  
 Sponsored Reserves to do, such as filling in where the  
 military have a proven inability to sustain in-house  
 skills that are safety or capability critical.
A way forward
Thus far, the MoD/front-line commands appear to have 
placed insufficient emphasis on the roles that Sponsored 
Reserves could play within WFA. A much more aggressive 
approach to the uses to which Sponsored Reserves can be put 
should help make up for under recruitment of  conventional 
Reserves and shortage of  Regulars.
A list of  all the roles that could be undertaken by Sponsored 
Reserves should be drawn up/refreshed and then prosecuted 
with vigour by a dedicated project team with a specific target 
of  capabilities to be augmented and sustained.
Individual cap badge sensitivities about maintaining their 
Regular manpower should be shelved, as the basis of  WFA 
will be to free Regular manpower to do the jobs that only they 
can do, leaving WFA to provide them with better support.
In parallel, renewed efforts need to be focused on working 
with a selection of  industrial players to create employment 
models that are fit for purpose, or at least for testing, and that 
have a degree of  flexibility to cater for different applications.
Recognising that a pilot may be 
appropriate, one industry 
organisation believes that 
it could deliver a 
Sponsored Reserve capability to the Army that would support 
the deployability of  a combat vehicle system currently in 
service. This would combine the work of  the company’s 
personnel who are currently employed to provide contract 
logistic support. The company in question recently submitted 
a paper to HQ Army on this concept. The key benefits to the 
Army that were highlighted include:
 
l  Reduced portfolio costs of  ownership across   
 Defence Lines of  Development.
l Mitigation of  health and safety critical skill fade  
 amongst RE operators and maintainers.
l Higher states of  operational readiness and freedom  
 of  action.
l Lower operational risk.
Conclusions
l  Meeting the national defence and security objectives  
 with all-Regular Forces is no longer affordable and,  
 in any case, is partly outmoded by the introduction  
 of  cross-government approaches to at least some  
 types of  missions.
l Recruitment and retention of  adequate numbers of   
 conventional Reserves, who can be deployed at short  
 notice on operations, seems to be beyond the ability  
 of  the UK to arrange.
l  Industry can, and does, fill a vital function with  
 CONDO but there are limits on how far forward  
 civilians can be deployed.
l  The key element that can plug the gap in capabilities,  
 and numbers, is Sponsored Reserves whose scope
 of  use should be expanded. Expansion of  Sponsored  
 Reserves should be taken forward as a priority with a  
 dedicated team to deliver specified targets.
l Key industry players are ready to take forward  
 discussions on propositions for expansion of  current  
 contract logistic support relationships with the Army  
 into a deeper Whole Force Approach.
In the summer and autumn of  2015 the Ministry of  Defence 
(MoD) was engaged in the preparation of  a Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the successor to that 
published in 2010. Doubtless there will be some important 
announcements in the 2015 review when it appears before 
the end of  the year, not least with regard to the UK nuclear 
deterrent and maritime air-patrol capability or multi-mission 
aircraft. However, commanders 
and analysts alike will be keen 
to explore the extent to which 
the SDSR takes forward the 
government’s commitment 
to its Whole Force Concept 
for defence, whereby military 
personnel, civil servants, 
Reserves, contractors and 
myriad elements of  multiple 
supply chains merge to deliver 
sought military effects. This 
Whole Force Approach or 
‘enterprise’ management stance 
is how the UK will exercise 
defence and security in the years 
ahead. Yet a number of  commentators make the case that all 
of  its components are not even mapped, let alone properly 
understood by policy-makers.
The essence of  this critique is that the MoD has a tendency 
to understate the importance of  its supply base and thus 
to live with risks that are not properly appreciated and 
assessed. The development of  the Whole Force Approach, 
with its focus on policies relating to personnel rather than 
enterprise management, has exacerbated this situation whilst, 
simultaneously, bringing more ‘partners’ into defence.
The MoD as buyer/consumer or producer
Within much of  the business literature there is a clear 
distinction between commercial entities that are buyers 
of  goods or services – thereby meeting a consumer need 
or selling-on into the marketplace – and those which are 
manufacturing entities that blend raw materials, technologies, 
production know-how and specific components to generate 
and, thereafter, support a particular product or service.23 
Based on this distinction, a first step for defence analysts is 
to consider whether the MoD should be seen primarily as a 
buyer and user of  goods and services, akin to the individual
consumer, or whether it should be viewed in the guise of  
a major entity that sources, blends, amends, develops and 
delivers military products or effects.
When the individual consumer opts to buy a television or 
even selects a builder for a home extension, he/she does not 
normally worry about the impact of  the choice on supply 
chains or even how the television manufacturer selects 
its suppliers. The focus is on the price, performance and 
reliability of  the final product and the consumer holds the 
brand manufacturer responsible for all the features of  the 
product, regardless of  where they came from: should the 
Toyota owner ever press the door opener on the key fob and 
find the car stayed locked, he or she would not observe that 
Toyota must have chosen a poor lock supplier.
Indeed, in tune with this scenario, some officials and political 
figures associated with defence view the MoD as essentially 
a purchaser of  goods and services from the private sector 
for deployment to meet defence and security ambitions. In 
interviews conducted in May-September 2015, a number of  
MoD officials and Service personnel took this initial instinctive 
position.24 A contrasting view underlines that the MoD is 
responsible for ‘producing’ things and not just ‘using’ things. 
The MoD’s own reporting and performance-measurement 
systems show that it is responsible for the generation of  
outputs (force elements able to act at varying degrees of  
notice) and outcomes (deterrence and success on operations).25 
The MoD’s central task is to produce UK defence policy 
and then to direct the generation of  military capabilities 
that support the delivery of  that policy. In the event of  a 
government decision to use those capabilities on an operation, 
it is then the role of  the MoD to oversee and even control that 
use so that it supports political objectives and operates within 
government-specified constraints.
Under this approach, the MoD, and the Armed Forces and 
agencies within it are significantly analogous to manufacturing 
organisations, bringing together 
all the diverse elements required 
for usable and sustainable 
defence capability. Some of  
those elements they generate 
within the governmental defence 
sector while (many) others are 
sourced from outside.
It would be difficult to 
exaggerate the dependence of  
UK defence on suppliers in 
the private sector, where the 
MoD spends more than half  
of  its money. Most obviously 
the MoD obtains all its equipment, spare parts and fuels 
from the private sector with the days of  the state arsenal 
being long gone. Moreover, the MoD is remarkably capital 
intensive, investing around a quarter of  its budget each year 
in the development and production of  new equipment. While 
the valuation of  military equipment is clearly problematic 
in many ways, it is noticeable that the MoD’s 2014-15 
Annual Report records the MoD holding property, plant and 
equipment assets worth £95 billion and intangible assets 
BEYOND THE WHOLE FORCE22
22Extract of  a paper published by RUSI in November 2015.
23For example, see Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornbill, ‘Research Methods 
for Business Students’, 2nd edition (Harlow: Pearson, 2000).
24The author conducted a number of  semi-structured interviews with Ministry of  Defence 
(MoD) officials and members of  the armed forces between May and September 2015.
25See multiple annual editions of  the MoD’s Annual Report and Accounts. For the 2014-
15 edition, see MoD, Annual Report and Accounts: 2014–2015, HC 32 (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2015). 
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– mainly reflecting research and development spending on 
equipment – of  £25.5 billion26, which together represent 
more than three times the ministry’s annual cash spend.
While less significant in overall financial terms, it is striking 
how much the MoD has passed responsibility 
for even the generation of  innovative ideas and 
initiatives for change to the private sector. For 
example, in 2015 in the Defence Equipment 
and Support (DE&S) organisation, Bechtel 
and CH2M Hill were advising on project- and 
programme-management transformation while 
PwC was advising on human resources. Even 
when the MoD sought to manage aspects of  
the extended enterprise, it needed others to 
help provide guidance on how to do it. The 
conclusion is clear and overt: without such 
external expertise the MoD would be unable to 
meet its obligations to the nation.
The MoD must be able to both generate 
capability and then, when called upon, use it. This means 
that the MoD requires significant flexibility and agility from 
its supply chains: defence equipment used on operations 
generally requires more fuel, spare parts and so on than when 
it is in a training or standby role. Moreover, many operations 
since the end of  the Cold War (and before that, the Falklands 
War) had not been envisaged in long-term defence plans, 
contained an element of  surprise and thus placed special 
demands on defence suppliers to accelerate production of  
certain items, to modify equipment for a particular campaign 
and theatre, and then to come up with novel products.27 The 
term ‘urgent operational requirement’ has 
become familiar in defence discourse, with UK 
forces having generated hundreds of  them since 
the end of  Cold War.
Thus the MoD can place significant demands on 
its suppliers, requiring them first to be efficient 
and effective in delivering their goods and 
services, and then flexible and agile in terms of  
being responsive to radical and rapidly changing 
circumstances. 
Finally, in defence, where human lives, as well as 
operations of  crucial importance to governments, 
can be at stake, it should be hoped that suppliers 
to the MoD should be resilient – that is, not 
excessively vulnerable to shock. Resilience has three dimensions: 
the capacity to avoid disruptive shock; the minimising of  
immediate impact should shock occur; and the rapid, as 
opposed to protracted, recovery from shock.
26MoD, Annual Report and Accounts: 2014–2015.
Rapid roll-out (clockwise from above left): Improved armour for the Challenger Main Battle Tank, the armoured vehicle Ridgback, the Reaper MQ-9 Remotely-Piloted Air System and the 
British Army’s new light protected patrol vehicle Foxhound are all recent examples of  Ministry of  Defence-commissioned urgent operational requirement programmes.
27For illustrations of  UK experiences in mobilising the private sector to support military 
operations since 1991, see Trevor Taylor, John Louth and Henrik Heidenkamp, ‘Industry 
and the Military Instrument’, in Adrian L Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military 
Operations since 1991 (London: RUSI, 2014), pp. 291–320.
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The MoD and the DEE
To what extent is extended-enterprise management currently 
reflected in MoD structures and practices? First, the Defence 
Operating Model, which is included in the MoD’s own 
guide to its workings, How Defence Works, does not give any 
prominence to the role of  external suppliers. The model, 
reproduced above, does not indicate that over half  the 
ministry’s money, and therefore hopefully more than half  
the elements of  capability, come from the private sector.28 
Nor does it signal any awareness of  the overall nature (size, 
location and complexity) of  the defence enterprise.
This is not to say that the MoD pays no attention to its 
suppliers: chaired by the secretary of  state, the Defence 
Suppliers Forum meets twice a year and has sub-committees 
for small and medium enterprises, a mid-tier group, and 
exports. The ministry knows the list of  companies with whom 
it contracts directly and how much it spends with each. Within 
individual DE&S groups and teams, there is knowledge of  
and concern about their contractors and their suppliers.29 
The government is also keen to increase the role of  small and 
medium enterprises in UK defence, not least through the 
Centre for Defence Enterprise. Moreover, the UK, along with 
many other states, seeks to influence (rather than manage) its 
defence industrial suppliers by a combination of  sponsorship, 
purchasing and regulation; individual initiatives including 
the Defence Growth Partnership are part of  this approach.30 
However, defence industrial structures and capabilities are 
shaped primarily by contractual commitments, as opposed to 
high-level policy statements, and supply chain resilience is a 
function of  this commercial hard-headedness. In the context 
of  the wider world, the UK may be strikingly out of  step in 
paying such limited attention to its supply base and national 
defence industrial sector, despite assertions to the contrary.31 
The defence enterprise or Whole Force approach resides 
within this ‘maybe.’
28MoD, ‘How Defence Works’, version 4.1, September 2014.
29MoD, ‘Finance and Economics Annual Bulletin: Trade, Industry and Contracts Statistics 
2015’, August 2015.
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in paying such limited attention to its supply 
base and national defence industrial sector, 
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30See Henrik Heidenkamp, John Louth and Trevor Taylor, The Defence Industrial Triptych: 
Government as Customer, Sponsor, and Regulator, RUSI Whitehall Paper 81 (London: 
Taylor and Francis, 2013).
31See Jacques S Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense 
Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). In Chapter 8, the author reviews the 
defence industrial policies of  a number of  states.
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The private security sector has developed significantly over the 
past decade and now provides a spectrum of  security solutions 
for a broad range of  clients operating in complex environments, 
where the rule of  law is weak. Private security companies’ 
clients include governments, global blue-chip companies 
and non-governmental organisations. For example, the US 
Department of  Defense regards the sector as a force multiplier.
Private Security Companies (PSCs) fully recognise that high 
levels of  compliance and ethics are essential to mitigating 
the risks inherent in working in complex environments, and 
believe that only an approach based on ethics and respecting 
human rights will deliver commercial sustainability. Equally, 
companies believe that if  the security situation requires the 
provision of  armed guards for the protection of  life, clients 
will want – and should expect – considerable reassurance that 
the supplier of  that service is capable, legal and reputable. 
Highly-regulated industries, such as the extractive sector, 
demand high standards from their security providers and 
PSCs know what is needed to deliver against the exacting 
standards required by large multi-national firms like BP or 
Shell.
Foreign direct investment in areas emerging from conflict is 
often key to stabilisation. The US recognised this in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan with the establishment of  the Task Force for 
Business and Stability Operations. International companies 
who take the step into these complex environments often rely 
on a private security solution to mitigate their risk.
British PSCs make a significant contribution to the UK’s 
export market through the provision of  services and their 
professionalism and expertise in supporting relief, recovery, 
reconstruction efforts and commercial business operations. 
In addition to providing direct revenue and employment 
benefits to the UK economy, 
PSCs enable clients to operate 
and win contracts in complex 
environments. 
UK Trade and Investment 
recognises the substantial and 
growing contribution of  this 
sector to UK exports, and hence 
the UK economy, and is working 
closely with the Security in 
Complex Environment Group 
(SCEG)32 to exploit future export 
opportunities. British PSCs wish 
to build on this and to work 
more closely with the MoD to 
develop a mutual understanding of  the potential opportunities 
for outsourcing.
Many British security companies – either directly or through 
SCEG – enjoy excellent relationships with several government 
departments in the UK. This relationship is mutually 
beneficial; the industry brings a different perspective to 
government policy-making and government can influence 
the development and improvement of  the security industry 
standards. SCEG members would like to extend this quality 
of  working and depth of  relationship to the MoD.
Legacy sensitivities
The industry has no illusions about the reputational and 
commercial damage that has been caused by a few untoward 
incidents. The imprisonment in April 2015 of  four former 
security contractors, who worked for the US company 
Blackwater in Iraq following a shooting incident in Baghdad 
in which 14 Iraqis were killed, points to the seriousness and 
sensitivities surrounding these activities. Any human rights-
related incident damages not just the individual company, but 
the sector more generally, as well as their clients.
 
The industry is also aware that in some quarters the sector 
is seen as providing ‘military’ type activities – this is also 
HOW THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR HAS 
DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST DECADE AND WHAT 
IT HAS TO OFFER THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
32The Security in Complex Environment Group was formed in January 2011, to define and 
introduce robust, widely recognised professional standards for the private security sector.
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damaging reputationally as well as misleading. The UK 
industry is very clear that it provides security and that it does 
not provide a military capability, and for this reason eschews 
the term ‘private military security company’.
The industry’s regulation journey
Over recent years the private security industry has worked 
very hard to develop and implement standards and regulation, 
and to operate in a transparent and accountable manner 
with human rights at the heart of  its business models. The 
UK sector has worked effectively with the UK Government 
and international bodies over the last 10 years to achieve 
a regulatory framework for private security that meets 
the requirements of  the UK Government’s Action Plan 
on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. More 
specifically, the regulatory framework for the private security 
sector includes both third-party audit and certification, and 
international monitoring of  and reporting on the activities of  
the sector and its constituent companies.
As part of  taking forward a regulatory framework based on 
voluntary regulation (in line with UK Government policy) 
British PSCs established the SCEG to develop professional 
standards and to spread best practice across the UK private 
security industry.
In 2011, after a competitive tender, the UK Government 
appointed the SCEG as its partner for the development and 
adoption of  standards for the UK private security industry. 
This created a unique construct whereby an industry body 
was trusted by the UK Government to be both a responsible 
partner in leading the adoption of  standards of  the sector, 
and a contributor to the development of  policy. Officials from 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Home Office, 
Department of  Transport and Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills routinely attend meetings, including 
meetings of  the executive committee of  the SCEG. The 
SCEG would wish to see the MoD being similarly engaged to 
develop the opportunities for a constructive relationship across 
the wider security and defence sector.
Standards and human rights monitoring
The first step in the road to regulating PSCs was the 2008 
Montreux Document33 governing the role of  states in their 
relations with private security service providers. The next 
step was the development of  the International Code of  
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (the Code) 
which focused on the industry, setting out commonly agreed 
principles for companies to endorse, and to commit to by 
signing the Code. The UK industry was a major contributor 
to both of  these international agreements.
The International Code of  Conduct envisaged two further 
steps: the development of  international standards with human 
rights at their heart, and the establishment of  an independent 
mechanism to externally monitor and oversee compliance 
with the Code.
A ‘Management System for Quality of  Private Security 
Company Operations – Requirements with Guidance’, 
also known as PSC.1-2012, was commissioned by the US 
government and developed as 
the first standard to translate 
the detailed and exacting 
requirements of  the Code into 
specific, auditable measures for 
land-based PSCs. The standard 
assesses whether companies’ 
policies and procedures – and 
crucially the implementation 
of  these on the ground – reflect 
key issues around human rights 
risks, including the impact of  
operations on stakeholders, rules 
on the use of  force, recruitment/
selection and training of  
personnel, and weapons 
movement, storage and their 
use. It was endorsed by the UK 
Government in 2013 and UK 
companies have been getting on with being independently 
audited and certified to PSC.1-2012 by United Kingdom 
Accreditation Service (UKAS) accredited certification bodies. 
PSC.1-2012, with few amendments, has now been converted 
into an international standard, ISO 18,788. Crucially both 
these standards, unlike other international standards, require 
independent auditors to inspect how activities are carried out 
in the field.
The establishment of  the ICoC Association (ICoCA) 
in September 2013 laid the foundations for the second 
requirement of  the Code. The ICoCA is a multi-stakeholder 
initiative involving civil society as well as governments and 
the industry itself. Its role is to monitor and report on how the 
industry generally, and companies individually, are delivering 
against the human rights-related requirements of  the Code.
In addition to these industry-specific standards, UK PSCs 
are fully compliant with the law and take very seriously legal 
requirements such as the UK Bribery Act, the UK Counter 
Terrorism and Security Act and the Modern Slavery Act.
In short UK PSCs operating successfully in the security sector 
today are well regulated, responsible companies with whom 
the MoD and British Army can with confidence do business.
Global reach and capability
The global reach and capabilities of  PSCs has also developed 
over recent years. In the main companies are multi-million 
pound global businesses, running complex multi-faceted 
operations in remote and hostile environments. They conduct 
24-hour operations, have the ability to deliver timely strategic 
and tactical reporting for their clients together with ‘softer’ 
capabilities such as liaison with the local community. 
The traditional roles of  man-guarding of  infrastructure and 
close protection for people will endure for some time yet, 
but increasingly companies are offering a wider range of  
services including risk mitigation, risk consultancy, intelligence 
assessments, EOD clearance, capacity building, training and 
equipping missions.
33Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices 
for States related to Operations of  Private Military and Security Companies during Armed 
Conflict.
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Current arrangements with OGDs
The process whereby PSCs provide protection to deployed 
government missions abroad in complex environments is 
well established. The FCO are the lead department for the 
provision of  this commercial ‘security platform’ and their 
procurement processes follow government guidelines. The 
potential providers are subjected to the usual pre-qualification 
questionnaire via the FCO’s e-Bravo portal; if  successful this 
is followed by the issue of  an invitation to tender. Tenders 
are assessed in an independent and rigourous manner, using 
the Most Economically Advantageous Tender guidance. The 
larger contracts are subjected to further scrutiny via the Office 
of  Government Commerce review processes. None of  this 
procurement activity would be a surprise or unknown to the 
MoD, and its use should reassure both the public servants and 
the tax payer.
Opportunities for the British Army 
using private security companies
The potential use of  PSCs by the MoD and Army to 
support and amplify their desired effect on operations is 
well demonstrated by our US allies. These functions cannot 
be offensive, nor can they replace the core military tasks 
such as assault and capture. But for example: the sharing of  
information; specific intelligence assessments; the provision of  
layered static security to protect operating bases; the conduct 
of  de-mining and general EOD tasks; the delivery of  capacity-
building tasks; many train and equip missions – and the list of  
tasks and the benefits in terms of  force replacement could go on.
Engagement with the MoD – a 
proposal by the UK security sector
The UK private security sector proposes that there are 
real benefits to be gained from developing a closer working 
relationship and therefore greater mutual understanding, 
leading to the potential to better assess the utility of  PSCs 
across the public security and defence sector. This relationship 
may be developed through the following initiatives:
l  An MoD representative to attend the SCEG  
 executive committee alongside the FCO.
l  SCEG to provide a better insight into the sector  
 through further presentations and lectures to defence  
 and security audiences, such as the staff college,  
 HCSC (as now) and RCDS.
l  The MoD and SCEG to work together on a   
 framework for outsourcing opportunities aimed at  
 delivering agile, professional and cost-effective  
 solutions that build on the strengths of  the military  
 and of  industry.
Private security companies are part of  
the security landscape of  the future
 
The security landscape is changing. Western defence spending 
is declining without a commensurate decline in political 
ambition. The UK’s national security strategy rejected any 
notion of  shrinkage of  the UK’s influence, despite significant 
cuts in the MoD and FCO budgets; this risks a strategic 
deficit. The private sector can help by providing skills and 
capacity that complement the military capabilities, but 
that does not replicate nor replace them. Over the years 
governments have increasingly outsourced to the private 
sector activities that do not need to be undertaken by the 
military; there is scope to do more and thereby focus scarce 
military capability on operational activities that are the 
prerogative of  states, not PSCs. 
SCEG companies are already involved in some capacity 
building and a wide range of  risk consultancy activity. It is 
not just man-guarding, but the delivery of  a whole range of  
activities in the area of  training, mentoring and support that 
PSCs can seek to support the MoD and UK Government’s 
efforts abroad. This trend will continue and will be of  real and 
direct benefit to the UK’s ability to influence the security and 
defence environment around the world.
The need for information and 
trust to enable this partnership
Finally, whichever remote and hostile environment within 
which the British Army wishes to operate, UK PSCs will have 
corporate knowledge of  the environment and the culture, as 
well as local contacts and networks. SCEG believes that the 
MoD could benefit from working more closely with the private 
sector to exploit this information, learn from the skills and 
experience gained by some highly-capable and agile private 
security providers in these most challenging of  complex 
environments.
Feasible function?: The Security in Complex Environment Group suggests the UK’s Armed 
Forces could follow America’s lead and turn to private security companies to conduct general 
EOD tasks on operations – a role overseen by members of  the British Army’s EOD & 
Search Taskforce in Afghanistan. During Op Herrick, the elite unit also mentored soldiers 
from the Afghan National Army in the tactics and procedures required to safely and 
professionally remove improvised explosive devices.
The UK’s national security strategy rejected any notion of  shrinkage of  the UK’s influence, despite 
significant cuts in the MoD and FCO budgets; this risks a strategic deficit. 
The private sector can help by providing skills and capacity that complements the military 
capabilities, but that does not replicate or replace them
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To conduct and sponsor research and analysis into the 
enduring nature and changing character of  conflict 
on land and to be the active hub for scholarship and 
debate within the Army in order to develop and sustain 
the Army’s conceptual component of  fighting power.
For further information about CHACR 
and its activities, please contact NSC on 
01276 673855 or chacr@nsc.co.uk
